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Abstract 
 
Objective. This article will begin by defining corruption, looking at the causes of and 
phenomenon correlated with corruption, as well as comparing some of the current solutions 
being proposed for dealing with it, and attempt to determine if higher education could lead to 
corruption. The aim of this research is to accept one of the following hypotheses: 
H1 : Higher Education might lead to corruption in developing countries 
H0 : Higher Education does not necessarily lead to corruption in developing                        
countries 
 
Also important to this analysis is the notion that by focusing on providing basic 
resources, to citizens with-in society, an anti-corruption scheme is laying the foundation for long 
term corruption reduction, something that, despite the recently heightened attention and billions 
of dollars of funding world wide has been elusive thus far among anti-corruption initiatives. 
Method. In order to achieve this aim an interdisciplinary analytical model of corruption 
phenomena is created where a (1) Micro analysis (2) Marco analysis (3) Wide analysis and 
finally a (4) Long analysis are assessed and combined in order to form a deeper understanding of 
education and its interplay with corruption. With-in this model various research and theories 
from diverse disciplines will be considered, some of which perhaps for the first time in 
connection with corruption, including; the social cognitive theory, Kohlberg’s framework of 
moral development, Klitgaard’s C = M + D - A corruption calculus, and the resource arena view 
of quality of life originated by Coleman (1971) and adapted by Falkenberg (1998), in 
conjunction with a review of select empirical findings and widely supported theoretical concepts 
to include moral suasion. Personal interviews with subject matter experts from USAID will also 
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be included in the analysis. Both perception and experience based corruption data will be used in 
the analysis, which is intended to add credibility to this interdisciplinary look at corruption and 
education due to the ever-prevalent questions of accuracy and reliability regarding corruption 
occurrence figures. The aim of using an interdisciplinary approach is to begin to create linkages 
between disciples and fill gaps that have prevented a holistic understanding of corruption and the 
phenomena surrounding it. 
Results. This article identifies a large divide in education between individuals in country 
leadership and the average citizen to be a potential cause of corruption in developing countries 
while an over all increase in education levels in society is thought to decrease corruption and 
build the foundations needed in a society for long term corruption reduction. Conclusion. The 
most important discovery of this article is the current lack of interdisciplinary cooperation among 
researchers in the many disciplines that are involved in anti-corruption initiatives. The hope is 
that the interdisciplinary model created here can be further used to create linkages that will allow 
for a deeper understanding of the phenomenon surrounding corruption. Future research is needed 
in order to create these linkages between the varied disciplines involved in the complex 
phenomena surrounding corruption, especially where a distinct lack of attention to some of the 
social sciences such as psychology and history was revealed while current research, and policy 
creation, has been heavily weighted toward economic causes and cures perhaps detrimentally to 
all but the elite in developing countries. This article does its part by using an interdisciplinary 
model of analysis to find support for the notion that anti-corruption schemes will be more 
effective in the long run if, among other things, they make narrowing the education gap between 
the general population in society and the highly educated leadership in developing countries a 
high priority 
Corruption and Education:  An Interdisciplinary Approach   5 
 
Table of Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ........................................................................................................................................2	  
ABSTRACT ..............................................................................................................................................................3	  
TABLE	  OF	  CONTENTS..........................................................................................................................................5	  
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................................6	  
CORRUPTION	  DEFINED ......................................................................................................................................7	  
HISTORY	  AND	  CULTURE ....................................................................................................................................8	  
CAUSES	  OF	  CORRUPTION ............................................................................................................................... 11	  
SUMMARY	  OF	  APPROACHES	  TO	  FIGHTING	  CORRUPTION .................................................................. 18	  ARE	  THERE	  EXAMPLES	  OF	  SUCCESS? ..................................................................................................................................27	  
PHILOSOPHY	  OF	  APPROACH......................................................................................................................... 30	  
MICRO	  ANALYSIS............................................................................................................................................... 32	  CORRUPTION	  DEMOGRAPHICS	  ON	  A	  MICRO	  LEVEL..........................................................................................................33	  THE	  SOCIAL	  COGNITIVE	  THEORY.........................................................................................................................................35	  CORRUPTION	  CALCULUS........................................................................................................................................................39	  MICRO	  ANALYSIS	  SUMMARY.................................................................................................................................................41	  
MACRO	  ANALYSIS.............................................................................................................................................. 42	  KOHLBERG’S	  STAGES	  OF	  MORAL	  DEVELOPMENT.............................................................................................................42	  MACRO	  ANALYSIS	  SUMMARY ...............................................................................................................................................47	  
WIDE	  ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................................................. 48	  EMPIRICS	  AND	  WIDESPREAD	  CORRUPTION.......................................................................................................................49	  WIDE	  ANALYSIS	  SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................................53	  
LONG	  ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................................................. 53	  MORAL	  SUASION	  AND	  HISTORICAL	  CHANGE.....................................................................................................................54	  THE	  RESOURCE	  ARENA	  THEORY .........................................................................................................................................58	  LONG	  ANALYSIS	  SUMMARY...................................................................................................................................................60	  
CRITICAL	  ANALYSIS.......................................................................................................................................... 61	  
CONCLUSIONS..................................................................................................................................................... 62	  
FUTURE	  WORK................................................................................................................................................... 65	  
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................................... 66	  
APPENDICES........................................................................................................................................................ 74	  APPENDIX	  1.	  IMPORTANCE	  OF	  CAUSES	  OF	  PUBLIC	  CORRUPTION...................................................................................74	  APPENDIX	  2.	  AFRICAN	  COUNTRY	  LEADERS’	  EDUCATIONAL	  DETAILS	  FOR	  THE	  YEAR	  2008.....................................75	  APPENDIX	  3.	  SUB-­‐SAHARAN	  AFRICA	  (SELECTED	  COUNTRIES)	  ILLITERACY	  RATES,	  2000 .....................................79	  APPENDIX	  4.	  RESOURCE	  ARENA	  MODEL ...........................................................................................................................80	  APPENDIX	  5	  CPI	  WORLD	  MAP.............................................................................................................................................80	  APPENDIX	  6.	  INTERDISCIPLINARY	  MODEL	  OF	  ANALYSIS................................................................................................81	  
 
Corruption and Education:  An Interdisciplinary Approach   6 
Introduction  
 
"Give a man a fish; feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish; feed him for a lifetime" 
Lao Tzu, 4th- 6th century BC 
 
Corruption is an important issue that has been present worldwide throughout the history 
of mankind. Yet only since the 1990’s has corruption garnered an increasing amount of attention 
from researchers. In these recent years academics of many disciplines, private organizations, 
governmental organizations, and the media alike on a global level have sought to better 
understand and battle corruption. This heightened level of attention to corruption is certainly a 
welcome change since research supports the notion that the reduction of corruption globally 
could increase the quality of life for millions, perhaps billions of people many of whom suffer 
from the poverty that is left in the wake of singular corrupt acts of grand corruption and endemic 
corruption alike. But the problem of corruption is complex one. The consequences, definition 
and causes of corruption are numerous which makes finding a solution difficult. And, as Everett, 
Neu and Rahaman put it “the ethical dispositions of those working in the anti-corruption field are 
complex, sometimes contradictory, and often hidden” (2006, p.1) making a complex problem 
even tougher to unravel. It is the same underlying idea of the actors in the anti-corruption realm 
portraying deceptive intentions that support the premise that a grassroots scheme of fighting 
corruption that engages local civil societies may be the only path toward sustainable corruption 
reduction, along with the notion that in order for a change to take place on a sustainable societal 
level it must be internally driven (Gordon, 2000). 
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Corruption Defined 
 
Though there are many definitions of corruption one of the most well known is - the 
abuse of public roles or resources for private benefit (Robinson, 1998), akin to the potentially 
most widely used definition, used by Transparency International, which defines corruption as - 
the misuse of entrusted power for private gain (Fagan, 2009). 
Defining corruption is crucial, and it should be noted that corruption may have many 
contextual definitions that differ, Everett, Neu and Rahaman (2006) find that these definitions, 
rather than being intent on better solving the problem, differ in a manner that is inclined to aid 
the specific cause(s) of the actor doing the defining.  According to Transparency International 
(Debere & Sidwell, 2009) corruption occurs anytime a public official or employee acts in an 
unethical manner where a disregard for the authority given to them as a public servant is misused 
and their own private gain is put before that of the public whom they are intended to serve. 
Though, in most societies, there is no requirement of altruism from public servants, there must be 
at the very least a sense of loyalty or duty to society, otherwise selfishness prevails and civil 
society will suffer. As long as officials believe that the country’s laws and regulations are not 
efficient or are unenforceable, meaning that cost of misuse of power is low with a high potential 
to gain, corruption will be given room to spread and erode existing governance structures and 
alienate, or worse, rob from the very civil society these public servants are intended to provide 
service to. As noted by Everett, Neu and Rahaman (2006) there are also differing definitions of 
corruption, these definitions usually stem from the purpose the author is intending to use the 
word for, or more appropriately, the goal the author is trying to achieve. They find the largest 
global actors produce the most literature and deal primarily, or as in the case of the World Bank 
Corruption and Education:  An Interdisciplinary Approach   8 
solely, in economic corruption. This results in a push for freer markets where unknowing or 
uncaring local actors can be manipulated to produce ends that benefit the outside actor, in this 
example, the World Bank. This is a specific phenomenon which is well documented in John 
Perkins’ Confessions of an Economic Hit Man (2004) and points to the need follow the trail of 
money that serves to promote grand corruption in developing countries. Of course, as implied by 
the existence of varying definitions, corruption has the ability to degrade and undermine on a 
myriad of levels including dismantling the legitimacy of the judicial system and government 
mandates set in place control corruption among private and public actors, which can 
progressively hinder economic growth and even thwart any form of development objective 
(USAID Anti-corruption Hand book, 2009). 
 
History and Culture 
 
Society has been burdened by corruption presumably as long as any type of society has 
existed. In a dissertation on public administration dating back to the fourth century B.C. in India, 
Kautiliya writes in his famous Arthasastra, 
 
Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey (or the poison) that finds itself at the 
tip of the tongue, so it is impossible for a government servant not to eat up, at 
least, a bit of the king's revenue. Just as fish moving under water cannot possibly 
be found out either as drinking or not drinking water, so government servants 
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employed in the government work cannot be found out (while) taking money (for 
themselves). (R. P. Kangle 1972, p. 91) 
 
Additionally, the idea that people have an obligation to act ethically is shared by nearly all, 
if not all, races, religions and cultures. In fact going back to ancient times, theological scholars 
will recall the story of Jesus and the woman who was caught in the act of adultery. In this case 
the people tested Jesus’ ethical stance, pointing out that biblical scriptures called for her to be put 
to death, (generally by stoning as was the practice at that time) Jesus’ reply to them was, “He 
who is without sin among you, let him cast the first stone.” (Nelson, T., 2002). This story 
highlights two important points. Firstly, that a rule of law, the Old Testament scriptures, was 
present and secondly that a unified ethical decision was agreed upon by the people making them 
shared values in their culture. This story also highlights the distinction between stages in 
Kohlberg’s stages of moral development, which will be covered in depth in the macro analysis. 
The idea that individuals are expected to act ethically remains today among all cultures and 
people just as it did in ancient times despite varying social norms. Falkenberg (1996) developed 
a procedure for developing a shared sense of "GOOD," originally inspired by John Rawls (1971) 
that can help us move toward this aim. Still the idea of a common “GOOD”, though well 
supported among academics, has resulted in little tangible results since it’s inception, which 
could go back to the reason for an economic focus toward battling corruption, which is that there 
are no sincerely altruistic actors in this fight and as the opening line of this research points out 
teaching people how to “fish” for them selves, or helping educate them especially in their role in 
society the degradation of corruption, might be the only real step toward any long term gains in 
any anti-corruption initiatives. 
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Yet throughout history countless cases of corruption can be found, often involving 
upstanding citizens and in repudiated societies, many times with the collusion of corrupt 
officials.  Examples range from, smuggling products such as sugar or tea in avoidance of taxes or 
bribing public servants for priority in a queue, to the enslavement and trafficking of people or 
embezzlement of millions or even billions of dollars usually against constitutional principles and 
certainly the most basic principles of write and wrong. But, as in the case of slavery in the United 
States when behavior is endemic in society it takes the will of the very society to reverse the 
momentum and cause a change to occur. One technique used, which this article will look into in 
depth later is moral suasion which is defined as the act of using moral principles to influence 
individuals, groups and even nations to change their beliefs and actions. Moral suasion was used 
heavily by abolitionists in the beginning of their abolitionist movement, the most official 
adoption of moral suasion occurred in 1832, by the Garrisonians, with the launching of the New 
England Anti-Slavery Society and was somewhat abandoned by more radical tactics as resistance 
intensified, the speeches and actions of John Brown exemplify this (James Stewart, 2007). Today 
moral suasion is being used by gay and lesbian rights advocates, the US government, 
nongovernmental organizations, and individuals all who try to use moral suasion to persuade 
others, often politicians or financial institutions, to act in an ethical manner where no 
enforcement power is present. Even American president Obama has used moral suasion to settle 
bipartisan disputes based on moral principles, such as the moral principle that everyone deserves 
adequate health care. These examples are based on both local values (swaying banking 
institutions to act fairly) and the broader “GOOD” that Falkenberg addresses which include 
among other things, human rights issues (slavery and gay rights for example) that are not specific 
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to a time or place. It is a commonly held idea that anti-corruption schemes require tailoring to 
specific local and national conditions to include cultural practices and traditions, among other 
things. This quickly raises the issue of “cultures of corruption” where corruption is endemic in 
society and in order to fight corruption there is a need to delve into the complex arena of cultural 
nuances where researchers need a close, even personal relationship to the phenomena if they are 
to have any hope of understanding and eventually being successful in any sort of anti-corruption 
effort. Recently, as experts step outside the bounds of traditional thought in the field of 
corruption new ideas have begun to emerge, Michael Johnston (2005) gives birth to the notion 
that all societies suffer corruption and that all corruption is detrimental to accountability, a 
welcome change from the mainstream view that corruption decreases as societies ‘develop’, 
which is vague at best. The idea of accountability suffering rather than development, in a sense, 
gives the control back to the local population and helps anti-corruption policy makers avoid the 
complex cultural differences that exist in the countries they intend to operate in. Clearly the 
depth of history and the still emerging ideas regarding corruption present today highlight the 
notion that there is much to learn and that the entrenched foundations of corruption will take 
considerable will to understand. The hope is that with better understanding and agreement on the 
phenomenon surrounding corruption that those engaged in fighting corruption will begin to see 
results from the billions of dollars and countless man-hours already channeled into the effort. 
 
Causes of corruption 
 
There is no shortage of difficulties in pin pointing the causes of corruption. Not the least 
of these is the fact that it is extremely difficult to measure. The two most widely used methods of 
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measurement today are; Transparency International’s corruption perception Index (CPI) and a 
rating of the control of corruption published by the World Bank, this article will focus on the CPI 
for it’s research, for continuity, due to the fact that the majority of the empirics and research 
included in this article stem from the same model, but it will also include experience based data 
to gain a well rounded look at corruption.  Both these sources are based on the surveys of 
international business people, expatriates, risk analysts, and local residents. The use of a 
corruption perception index is justified because the actual level of corruption in a country is by 
its very nature extremely difficult to observe. For example, actual cases of arrest and conviction 
for corrupt acts with-in a country are not a good measure of corruption since the may not include 
the cases that weren’t convicted. It is also important to note that as the awareness of corruption 
and it’s negative effects have grown in popularity; corrupt individuals have also used it as a 
means to snuff out political competition and gain popular support with no real intention of 
corruption reduction which can lead to concealment of corrupt acts, or even inflated 
representations of corruption, but certainly skewed numbers of actual cases of corruption to 
study. Keeping that in mind, measures are taken to reduce measurement error in corruption 
perception indexes by averaging different sources and Transparency International, for example, 
estimate perceived corruption rather than the actual instances of corruption in each country it 
reports on. Though not perfect, studying corruption perception indexes is the best option 
available given the nature and complexity of corruption.  
As efforts to understand corruption increase, empirical studies have uncovered several 
useful findings. For example, Treisman concludes that states are perceived by business people 
and their citizens to be less corrupt if; they are highly developed, long established liberal 
democracies, with a free and widely read press, a high share of women in government, and a 
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long record of openness in international trade. He goes on to explain that countries with intrusive 
business regulations, that suffer from unpredictable inflation, or are dependent on fuel exports 
are perceived to be more corrupt (Treisman, 2007). Treisman concludes that despite the fact that 
we cannot say that most of these factors cause corruption perceptions to be high or low, the 
strongest evidence in favor of that relationship is found between economic development 300 
years ago and today’s perception of corruption in that country via economic growth. He also 
points out that this is a good indication that we are getting better at constructing indexes of 
perceived corruption and matching them to explanatory variables (Treisman, 2007). He asserts 
that corruption perception indexes may well be capturing the best true prevalence of corruption, 
citing the biased nature of “noisy” experience based measures.   
Klitgaard, a consultant for the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the World Bank, to name a few formed the equation; Corruption equals Monopoly 
power plus Discretionary power minus Accountability or, C = M + D - A which was created by 
Klitgaard in 1998 and has come to be the framework of choice for a large number researchers, of 
various disciplines but especially those in favor of free markets or an economic focus toward 
anti-corruption. Klitgaard said, “Corruption is a crime of calculation, not passion. When the size 
of the bribe is large, the chance of being caught small, and the penalty if caught meager, many 
officials will succumb” (1998, p.1). Klitgaard’s corruption equation, based on the principle agent 
paradigm, is categorized by Everett, Neu and Rahaman (2006) as an “exit” strategy meaning that 
alternatives or substitutes should to be available so that actors can exit a situation if corruption is 
thought to be present, a free market rather than restrictive “control” strategy that they also 
document as a strategy type. 
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Many recent theories have focused on institutions in their search of understanding about 
the causes of corruption, rather than the individuals with-in these institutions. Rose Ackerman 
explains that the removal of corrupt officials from office will have little effect on corruption if 
the organization and incentives that cultivate it are not changed (Ackerman, 2000). Xin and 
Rudel describe a melding of Klitgaard’s equation and the principle agent paradigm by saying, 
 
The most influential of the institutional frameworks, referred to as 
‘‘principal-agent analysis,’’ examines the relationships between three actors: the 
citizens, the principal (a governor), and an agent (a public official) who manages 
the relationship between the citizens and their government (Klitgaard, 1988). 
Agents commit corrupt acts when they have wide discretion in their actions, little 
accountability, and considerable monopoly power (Riley, 1998:134). Following 
this line of analysis, reformers can reduce corruption by limiting official 
discretion, increasing controls over officials, and reducing state power. To 
accomplish these ends, principal-agent analysts want to diminish official 
discretion by strengthening democratic political processes and to reduce 
monopoly power by shrinking the state. (Xin and Rudel, 2004 p. 296). 
 
Perhaps the strongest indication of the complexities of corruption and its causes is the 
relationship that culture plays in on the occurrence of corruption. Scholtens and Dam (2007) find 
that there are significant differences among ethical policies for organizations (firms) that are 
based out of different countries. They use Hofstede’s cultural indicators (power distance, 
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individualism versus collectivism, and masculinity versus femininity, uncertainty avoidance, and 
long- versus short-term orientation) to associate ethical policies in organizations and find that 
individualism and uncertainty avoidance are positively correlated with an organizations ethical 
policies while masculinity and power distance are negatively related to these policies. Thus they 
contend that its impossible to make the assertion that corruption can be battled the same way 
across the world, or that it even looks the same across regions or societies, which only adds to 
the complexities of its causes.  Additionally, even though corruption has a nearly universal 
definition, the values of a society that breed corruption or form ethical norms vary widely. 
 
Compilation of factors found to be correlated with corruption 
 Positive	  correlation	   Negative	  correlation	  Economic	  development	    ✔ Long	  established	  liberal	  democracies	    ✔ Free	  and	  widely	  used	  press	    ✔ High	  share	  of	  women	  in	  Government	    ✔ Openness	  to	  international	  trade	    ✔ Highly	  Educated	  Males,	  with	  high	  income,	  age	  20-­‐60	  in	  large	  cities	   ✔	    High	  GDP	  per	  Capita	    ✔ Improved	  country	  level	  Education	    ✔ Intrusive	  business	  regulations	   ✔  Unpredictable	  inflation	   ✔  Dependence	  on	  fuel	  exports	   ✔  “Bad”	  institutions	   ✔  Socio-­‐political	  Environment	  that	  allows	  agents	  to	  have	  wide	  discretion	   ✔  Socio-­‐political	  Environment	  that	  demands	  little	  accountability	  of	  agents	   ✔  Socio-­‐political	  Environment	  that	  allows	  for	  considerable	  Monopoly	  power	   ✔  
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Organizations	  or	  cultures	  with	  high	  individualism	    ✔ Organizations	  or	  cultures	  with	  high	  uncertainty	  avoidance	    ✔ Organizations	  or	  cultures	  with	  high	  masculinity	   ✔  Organizations	  or	  cultures	  with	  high	  power	  distance	   ✔  
Source: data taken from research articles included in this article written post 1997 
 
 
Perhaps the largest barrier in the battle against corruption has been that developed 
countries and their organizations have wrongly assumed that each country has a comparable 
measure of justice and ethical behavior. This again points to the idea highlighted by Andreas 
Falkenberg (1994) that a global agreement upon “GOOD” practices is needed. Falkenberg said 
that in creating this universal standard: 
1. We cannot fully rely on our culture's values or on our built-in 
      moral compass to guide us in justice or in ethics. 
2. We cannot conclude that our current institutions; laws, norms, 
      values, customs, and rules are "just." 
3. We cannot be sure that we are "ethical" in our conduct if we 
      follow the current institutions. 
He goes on to state that the three principles needed to form “GOOD” and just institutions 
are (a) survival; (b) equal moral standing; and (c) distribution of index goods - income, wealth, 
social basis for self respect, professional powers, and rights, etc. (Rawls, 1971), according to the 
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maxi-min rule. (1994) This is crucial to understanding corruption because the norms and values 
of individuals, in this case generally politicians, are ranked (see Appendix 1) as the most 
important cause of corruption in lower income countries. (McCuster, 2006) McCuster goes on to 
assert that, in summary, the three most important causes of corruption among high and low 
income countries alike are firstly the norms and values of politicians and public servants 
followed by, lack of control supervision and auditing, followed finally by interrelationships in 
business and politics. (McCuster, 2006) 
So it stands to reason that in order to address corruption in any sort of a long-term sense 
we need to investigate the values and norms of individuals in the societies in question. The idea 
of individuals affecting the level of corruption in a society is made clearer when we consider that 
grand corruption, the unashamed looting of national riches, in so detrimental in developing 
countries where the losers are likely to be the exceptionally poor, female, and marginalized, 
while the winners are already wealthy, usually more educated, and part of an inefficient, swollen 
state. This corrupt of misallocation of resources happens where poverty is a product of unequal 
wealth distribution and where it is also a consequence of the social exclusion of the poor (Riley, 
2004). Among the top development organizations world wide, USAID has shifted its attack on 
corruption from a focus on administrative corruption to one of grand corruption among political 
and economic elites that will exist along side their continued efforts to curb administrative 
corruption. (Del Castillo, 2010) 
 Economic development is very relevant to the perceived existence of corruption; in fact the 
correlation between economic development and corruption is very strong. Treismann (2006) 
found it to survive the inclusion of a variety of controls (for ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 
latitude, region, religion, culture, democracy, trade, inequality, inflation, and various policy 
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variables), and to be found in each region of the world. But the question of whether or not 
economic development reduces corruption is a tough one. This strong relationship raises other 
questions as well, such as; does corruption slow economic development, or could both be caused 
by some third factor?  
 
Of the relationship between democracy and corruption Treismann finds that there is no 
solid evidence that the actual frequency of corrupt interactions, as judged by experience-based 
data is related to democratic institutions. However, fairly robust evidence exists that countries 
with currently high levels, and long histories of liberal democracy—especially those with a 
strong free press—are perceived to be less corrupt. Also concerning the use of corruption 
perceptions based data, he states “endogneity is as great a concern as in the case of economic 
development. Corruption could itself weaken democratic institutions or could be caused by 
factors that also undermine democracy“ (Treismann, 2006, p. 25). 
 Andvig and Fjeldstad (2001) echo Treismann (2000) and assert that having found strong 
empirical evidence that the process of successful economic development reduces corruption 
considerably in the long run, but little in the short run, and not finding the mechanism through 
which this works, saying “One possibility is through a rationalization of public and private roles 
and spread of education, which makes abuses harder to conceal” (p. 101). 
 
Summary of approaches to fighting corruption 
 
While we have complied a sizable amount of data to about the causes of corruption in the 
recent history (though few are strongly supported), there is a strange ambivalence toward the 
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effects of corruption, which has direct implications on our reaction toward it.  As we’ll see later 
there is good reason to believe this disparity in information could be due the actors and their own 
agendas in the world of anti-corruption. Michael Johnston puts it this way in his book Syndromes 
of Corruption; 
The effects of corruption are often reduced to economic data, facilitating 
statistical work but to often equating human wellbeing with trends in GDP, and 
saying even less about justice.  Much of the debate has been driven by groups 
advocating the bundle of changes commonly called globalization – outlooks and 
policies that I see as more positive than not, but that have a way of framing 
corruption issues in terms of obstructions to free markets, and reform as primarily 
a task of continued economic liberalization… reform recommendations tend to 
vary rather little. (2005, preface x-xi) 
 
 Jeff Everett, Dean Neu, and Abu Shiraz Rahaman compiled and examined two sets of 
documents in their analysis of the actors involved in the fight against corruption globally (2006). 
The first set consisted of roughly 200 association, think-tank, and academic reports, books, and 
papers dealing with the topic of corruption the second set examined the websites or position 
papers of nearly, if not all, the major global governance actors to gain insight on the different 
approaches taken by each. They were able to group the approaches of these organizations into 
three categories. These categories are; the use of expert “control” to align the environment in a 
manner that reduces or blocks corruption, “exit” which uses Klitgaard’s famous C = M + D – A 
corruption calculus to allow actors an exit away from corruption generally by the reduction of 
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government bureaucracy which limits the free market, or “voice” solutions which call on the 
active involvement of civil society to unify in agreement against the forms of corruption present 
in that society. This research team uncovers an interesting finding, they discover that the actors 
involved in fighting corruption implement approaches that are often tied to the their own motives 
and different phenomena they have chosen to “problematize”. They say, 
 
What emerges from our analysis is the need to ask certain questions prior 
to intervening in the field. Namely, is corruption a problem because the poor are 
being victimized by it? Is it a problem because it impedes efficiency? Is it a 
problem because it can be used to enhance the expert’s symbolic capital? Or is it a 
problem because it is essentially a social phenomenon, which doesn’t accord well 
with the strictly economic models developed by those in charge of the system of 
global governance? Before business leaders, or anyone for that matter, decide to 
commit them- selves to helping fight this ‘‘cancer’’ or ‘‘virus,’’ they need to 
decide what they think corruption is, why they think they need to solve it, and 
how they wish to solve it. They also need to acknowledge that they may well be 
an endogenous variable or determinant factor in the corruption equation. (Everett, 
Neu, Rahaman, 2006, p.9) 
 
Of the three approaches found in their research the team points out that the favored 
approach, or the one most commonly employed, is the exit approach. This approach which they 
found to be favored by both the IMF and WB as well as many of the large global governing 
actors, is based on economic principles which they say are proposed with a great deal of 
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confidence, despite the fact that the majority of the research in the area in inconclusive, and a 
discipline (economics) that by nature erases moral concerns.  
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is primarily 
concerned with promoting development in developing countries, and as such has a strong interest 
in the reduction of corruption, which has been strongly connected to poverty and harmful effects 
on economic development (Treismann, 2007).  In 2006 USAID spent a total of US$ 403,361 
thousand on the combination of economic initiatives and the promotion of democracy in Africa, 
largely control and exit strategies, compared to the US$ 121,727 thousand the agency put toward 
broader access to education in the same year which builds human capitol in developing countries 
and would be considered a voice strategy. Meaning USAID spent roughly a third of the money it 
spent in Africa on educational, voice, programs as it did on economic and governance, control 
and exit, strategies in 2006. By 2009 USAID spent a total of US$ 614,686 thousand on the 
combination of economic initiatives and the promotion of democracy in Africa, largely control 
and exit strategies, compared to the US$ 219,291 thousand the agency put toward broader access 
to education in the same year. These figures translate into higher overall funding toward both 
areas of aid, and only a slightly larger portion toward education, voice initiatives (USAID 
financial reports, 2006 & 2009). Though there has been a larger push in USAID toward 
programming that promotes local ownership with the goal of sustainability, these figures indicate 
that proportionately funds are being allocated much the same as they had been before. There 
could be several reasons for this, perhaps the size of an agency as large as USAID hinders quick 
change, perhaps the bureaucracy and red tape of a governmental agency can be blamed, or 
perhaps the fact that the American election process of four years is not enough time for the 
political leadership of the agency to show proof of change through the use of voice initiatives 
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such as increased educational opportunities that could take decades to take hold, so the funds are 
spent on short term, quick results schemes. And if that is true, could it be said that the short lived 
ups and downs of the corruption perceptions index in developing countries are due to the quick 
results given by the short term economic exit schemes Everett, Neu, Rahaman have found to be 
favored in battling corruption. The actual use of funds by USAID as well as the in depth research 
done uncovering the favored usage of exit schemes by the major actors in anti-corruption word 
wide could point to the reason there has not been one strong example of corruption reduction in 
developing countries by the Corruption Perceptions Index. 
In Rob McCuster’s review of anti-corruption strategies (2006) we again find three 
categories of anti-corruption strategies. He categorizes these approaches as; Interventionalism, 
which entails a reactionary approach where offenses take place and are found out and punished, 
Managerialism, where the establishment of appropriate systems or institutions manage away the 
chances of corruption taking place, and finally Organizational Integrity, the integration of 
operational systems, corruption control strategies and ethical standards create a norm of ethical 
behavior.  These three basic strategy groups are parallel to those of Everett’s team of researchers, 
and seem to form a pattern of assessment for anti-corruption schemes. However, he also notes 
that Huberts (1998) distinguishes six focus strategies that break down into more specific methods 
of action.  
Economic – emphasizes the need for the economic stimuli for corruption to be reduced and 
suggests that such might be achieved by, inter alia, paying higher civil service salaries 
Educational – aims at altering the attitudes and values of the populace and civil servants 
alike via training and education campaigns and engagement of the media 
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Cultural – ensuring that the behavior and attitudes of those in power are subject to stringent 
codes of conduct and their behavior filters down to civil servants 
Organizational or Bureaucratic – strengthening internal control systems such as auditing to 
detect corrupt activity, and staff rotation to reduce the propensity for individuals to establish 
themselves in entrenched corruption 
Political – increasing in transparency in terms, for example, of the monitoring of party 
finances and more broadly, a clearer and more definite separation of powers in terms of the 
judiciary and the state 
Judicial or Repressive measures – advocates harsher penalties for corrupt practices but also 
the creation of independent anti-corruption agencies. 
(McCuster 2006, p. 20) 
 McCuster	  summarizes	  his	  analysis	  with	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  holistic	  approach	  to	  anti-­‐corruption	  like	  that	  of	  TI’s	  National	  Integrity	  System	  (see	  below)	  which	  places	  society’s	  values	  and	  public	  awareness	  at	  the	  foundation	  of	  it’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategy.	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Michael Johnston, a man named 36 in 100 Most Influential People in Business Ethics 
2008 by Ethisphere.com (2010) gives his view of the reforms needed to battle corruption in this 
way: 
 At	  one	  level,	  successful	  reforms	  will	  help	  a	  society	  withstand	  corruption	  and	  may	  shift	  the	  problem	  itself	  toward	  less	  disruptive	  forms.	  	  But	  at	  a	  more	  basic	  level	  the	  issue	  is	  justice	  –	  enhancing	  citizens’	  ability	  to	  pursue	  and	  defend	  their	  own	  economic	  and	  political	  wellbeing	  free	  from	  abuse	  and	  exploitation	  by	  political	  and	  economic	  elites.	  	  The	  opportunity	  to	  participate	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in	  open,	  competitive,	  and	  fair	  political	  and	  economic	  processes	  and	  link	  them	  to	  each	  other	  while	  restraining	  their	  excesses,	  are	  both	  defining	  characteristics	  of	  our	  four	  syndromes	  and	  ultimate	  goals	  of	  reform	  (Johnston,	  2005,	  p.	  187).	  
	  
Johnston’s	  reference	  to	  the	  four	  syndromes	  is	  where	  his	  	  research	  differs	  from	  previous	  subject	  matter	  experts.	  Though	  Johnston	  agrees	  broadly	  that	  development	  in	  the	  form	  of	  “Strong	  institutions	  and	  balanced	  participation	  (to)	  enable	  societies	  to	  reform,	  to	  respond	  to	  corrupt	  activities	  more	  effectively.”	  (2005,	  p.	  199)	  is	  the	  key,	  he	  also	  lays	  out	  a	  path	  dependent	  approach	  to	  brining	  about	  those	  reforms	  based	  on	  four	  corruption	  syndromes	  (influence	  markets,	  elite	  cartels,	  oligarchs	  and	  clans,	  and	  official	  moguls)	  present 
in each respective country. Johnston’s main argument is that these particular syndromes of 
corruption are linked, via participation and institutions, to deeper problems of development, and 
his work has opened a new avenue of research into political corruption that, in his own word, 
“offers a better understanding of the contrasting ways the problem develops and functions in real 
settings” and “(it) can also suggest countermeasures appropriate in differing settings, and ways to 
avoid doing unintended damage through unwise reforms” (p.35). Though admitting that much 
more comparative research on corruption is urgently needed, Johnston states that the recent focus 
on economic liberalization in the battle against corruption has shown us more than ever that 
strong, accountable, public institutions are the solution (2005). 
The	  overriding	  idea	  of	  developing	  strong	  institutions	  to	  support	  a	  society	  where	  citizen	  participation	  controls	  corruption	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  our	  current	  state	  of	  operation	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globally	  according	  to	  the	  findings	  of	  Everett, Neu, and Rahaman (2006) who found the “voice” 
strategy to largely be just an addition to either a “control or “exit” strategy among the largest 
global actors of anti-corruption. Also interesting to note is the fact that though TI’s corruption 
perception index is relied upon by a large number of researchers and anti-corruption stake 
holders world wide, though the manner from which it measures corruption, the individual 
populous or civil society its self (a bottom up approach), is often not the means those 
stakeholders or governing bodies are using to fight corruption. Instead methods of economic and 
institutional reform are more widely employed, which fit into the control and exit strategies laid 
out by Everett, Neu, and Rahaman. This is not surprising when we consider the notion that the 
majority of the largest actors in the global anti-corruption arena are funded directly by 
governments (predominantly western) that have primary obligations to their own citizens needs 
first. As Everett, Neu, and Rahaman  point out, 
 
Virtue ethics forces us to consider whether those fighting corruption are indeed 
themselves virtuous or moral actors. … it is not without some irony that these two 
organizations (IMF and the WB) have taken a leading role in the fight to 
safeguard public office. We say ironic because both of these organizations are 
promoters of global free enterprise and they are themselves contradicting 
Klitgaard’s general, C=M+D A anti-corruption formula: both organizations have 
a great deal of discretion (D), they are close to being, if not are, monopolistic (M), 
and they are far from being accountable (A), in a number of important ways … 
these two organizations are not particularly willing to accept responsibility for the 
turmoil that has often been left in the midst of their liberalization efforts… and 
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specific to the issue of corruption, they have little interest in talking about the fact 
that privatization has at times actually increased the amount of corruption in those 
countries to whom they give loans (p.8). 
	  
Are there Examples of Success? 
 
 In short, there are few success stories or examples of actually reducing corruption in a 
sustained way (OECD, 2003).  Since 1995 Transparency International has been releasing their an 
annual corruption perceptions index report. This index is arguably the most widely used indicator 
of corruption in the world, it has grown in scope while added and dropped countries, and slightly 
changed it’s methodologies over time but remains an excellent source of cross country 
comparison for the prevalence of corruption. A quick perusal of the corruption perceptions index 
shows that the battle against corruption has very few winners over that decade-plus time span of 
time and includes several countries who seemingly made strides against corruption but have 
since fallen back to the same levels or worse since then (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001). There are 
however examples of progress including, Hong Kong, Singapore, Nigeria and Bangladesh. Of 
the four, Hong Kong and Singapore were both city-states that had fairly authoritarian 
governments when they began their anti-corruption efforts, they are also both included in the 
group known as the Four Asia Tigers renowned for their exceptional economic growth and 
therefore not considered developing countries (OECD, 2003).  Nigeria and Bangladesh are both 
developing countries who have seen success in their fight against corruption, but the success of 
Bangladesh, laudable as it is, should still be considered a short term achievement being that it’s 
leap from last place in the corruption perceptions index (held from 2001-2005) to rank 139 
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among 180 countries will need to hold through a transitionary period to be sure the gains are 
sustainable. It is also important to remember that these countries are still considered highly 
corrupt on a global scale. Nigeria is deserving of investigation for its consistent, though not as 
overwhelming, success at reducing corruption over the last decade. Nigeria held a Corruptions 
perceptions index score of 0.60, where 10 is totally corruption free and has risen to 2.5 in 2009.  
Nigeria has been a key player in the international oil industry since the 1970s, and maintains 
membership in Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which it joined in 
1971. Today it is classified as a mixed economy emerging market. One would think the 
successful, oil driven economy of Nigeria would be a hindrance in the fight against corruption 
because the lack of strong institutions coupled with the large amounts of money flowing through 
such an under developed country. To a degree that is the case, in the period of 1991-1997, the 
losses due to corruption in Nigeria are estimated to be 66.05 and 66.79 percent of GDP per capita 
while the losses for Norway for example were 11.2 percent of GDP per capita (Dreher, 
Kotsogiannis & McCorriston, 2004). Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala Distinguished Fellow of  The 
Brookings Institution and Former Finance Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2003-
2006) concluded that to often the corruption debate is “centered on economic corruption – on 
cases of rent seeking, on procurement fraud, on leakages in government budgets … the World 
Bank’s Governance and Anti-corruption plan … is interpreted all in economic terms.” (2007) 
She goes on to state during her speech entitled Corruption: Myths and realities in Developing 
Country Context, that she battled economic corruption tirelessly while in office. She says, 
 
 … we will all be deluding ourselves if we believed this myth that economic 
corruption is the key to tackling corruption in developing countries. I want to 
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argue that the big elephant in the room, which is often ignored, is political 
corruption, and unless tackled this will and does undermine all the focus on 
fighting economic corruption and improving governance in the economic sphere 
(2007). 
 
 Transparency International reported that in 1999 democratic elections in South Africa cost 
political parties between US $40-67 million (2007). Dr. Okonjo-Iweala estimates that Nigerian 
political parties spent hundreds of millions of dollars on state and federal elections, and goes on 
to assert that this huge push for democratic elections result in political parties and processes in 
emerging democracies that are very prone to corruption. In her address at the annual Richard H. 
Sabot lecture series (2007) she says “I am worried that political corruption in pernicious forms 
may be taking hold on the African continent as ways are sought to emulate Western forms of 
campaign finance but without the strong institutions and safeguards existing in Western 
democracies.” This idea has been pointed out in the past as well for developing countries such as 
the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea and even China (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001). The idea 
that the major world players in anti-corruption such as the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund deal solely in an economic context in their anti-corruption schemes seems all to 
restrictive when expert local nationals, as well as historical results, in a continent potentially 
hardest hit by corruption are providing this sort of valuable feedback. Not all developing 
countries are like Nigeria, and for that matter not even those on the African continent, are 
comparable, which is why experts of each respective discipline have called for individualized 
anti-corruption schemes based on all the socio-economic make-up of each country and region, 
and why experts of all disciplines need to work jointly in order to make progress. This idea is 
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echoed by a team of experts in the OECD, who stated, 
 
 
What is clear is that country conditions vary widely from the poor HIPC (heavily 
indebted poor countries) countries to large resource-rich countries, such as 
Nigeria and the variable transition economies, so that there can be no one 
approach. Many still argue that only major and rapid reforms will be effective. 
There appears to be a growing pragmatism that more selective and long-term 
solutions suited to the conditions of individual countries are the direction to go. 
Reducing corruption is only one objective of such reforms (Bailey, 2003). 
 
 
In the case of Nigeria, the one (if any can be named) success on the anti-corruption front 
globally expert local nationals echo the idea held my researches like Michael Johnston that 
corruption has different syndromes, or appears in different ways in different countries. If we are 
to listen to Dr. Okonjo-Iweala, it is easy to come to the conclusion that corruption may have 
simply taken a more hidden political form than the openly economic one it once had and perhaps 
not even been diminished. 
 
Philosophy of Approach 
 
As a plan of attack, this paper will utilize a newly created model of assessment of 
individual phenomena that is useful for highly complex real world problems that require the 
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faculties of the whole of the scientific and academic community in coordination with those 
stakeholders in the field to produce an understanding that will hopefully lead to universal truths, 
and eventually progress where there is currently little to none to speak of. This article will look at 
education in developing countries in relation to corruption and apply an interdisciplinary set of 
theoretical and empirical research, in order to create a deeper understanding of the phenomenon 
and construct specific recommendations to fight corruption in developing countries. Because of 
the complexities of corruption to include its occurrence and role in society, a myriad of 
approaches to researching it from the various disciplines exist. This model will break them down 
into a, (1) micro analysis (2) macro analysis (3) wide analysis (4) Long analysis of education as 
it relates to the prevalence of corruption in developing countries. See model below: 
 
Model influenced by a special topic forum of the Academy of Management Review (2008) 
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The following is the application of the new model as used for this analysis of education 
and corruption to gain a deeper understanding and make specific recommendations in order to 
better fight corruption.  
 
Model influenced by a special topic forum of the Academy of Management Review (2008) 
 




The individual or group level of corruption is one that is easy to associate with, and the 
idea that one particular person or group is responsible for the corruption that is uncovered is one 
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that perhaps we all tend toward perhaps because we can easily relate to being cut in line at a 
governmental office or paying, or avoiding paying, a violation fee of some sort be it for a traffic 
infraction some other form of ticket. (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Zimbardo, 2004) Largely accepted 
among researchers is the idea that any anti-corruption scheme needs to incorporate a tailored 
approach, it also seems clear that the scheme should also account for the complexities of the 
individual psyche and societal interaction affects present in the differing environments where 
corruption is being fought. At the micro level of this interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of 
corruption we will investigate some lesser visited theories and empirical figures in order to gain 
a deeper understanding of the phenomena of education in relation to corruption on a micro level.   
 
Corruption Demographics on a Micro Level 
 
Regarding micro-scale causes of corruption, recent theoretical work widely identifies the 
causes for corruption in a combination of institutional conditions: monopoly power, little 
accountability, and wide discretion. While theoretically this is sound, this article would suggest 
however that there is much more substance to the causes of corruption at the micro-scale, and 
that this simple combination of institutional conditions leads to a heavily favored “exit” strategy 
among anti-corruption initiatives where economics are the focus and societies and the individuals 
inside them seem to be the after thought. 
On a micro level corruption has been attributed to, among other things, demographics. 
Naci Mocan (2008) finds that the determinants for being exposed to corruption, or asked for a 
bride, include education, sex, personal income, age and whether you live in a small or large city. 
More specifically he finds that highly educated males, with a high income, between the ages of 
20 and 60, living in large cities will be targets of corruption. This study also reveals that country 
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attributes affect corruption. For example, the strength of institutions in the country (as measured 
by low risk of expropriation) reduces corruption, while an improved education on a country level 
is negatively correlated with individuals being asked for a bribe along with unemployment in the 
country being positively correlated to individuals’ exposure to corruption. To arrive at these 
results Mocan builds upon the work of Treisman (2000) and Mauro (1995) as well as Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2001), to create the equation: 
 
(1)  CORij = f ( Xij; Cj, Hj, Kj ) 
 
Where CORij is the propensity of the ith individual who lives in the country j to be a 
victim of corruption. Xij represents personal characteristics of the individual, Cj represents the 
cultural attributes of country j, Hj stands for human capital measures that impact economic 
development, such as the level of education in the country. It should be noted that these findings 
were arrived at with the use of the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) compiler by the 
United Nations Inter-regional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) using face to face 
and telephone interviews where participants were directly asked if they were asked to take 
bribes, meaning that the corruption data was not based on perception such as that of TI’s widely 
used corruption perception index. The use of both perception and experience-based data is 
intended to add credibility to our interdisciplinary analysis of corruption and education. This is 
one of the few studies that uses actual instances of corruption rather than the perception of 
corruption which addresses the problem of an indirect measure of corruption since the perception 
of corruption can be misguided in a society, and the perception of corruption could be slower or 
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quicker to change over time than actual occurrences since the element of being educated about 
the actual affects of changes is added. Keeping this in mind Mocan (2008) finds highly educated 
males with high income between the age of 20 and 60 who live in large cities are more likely to 
be asked for a bribe, these supply side finding were well supported if not under stated due to the 
inherent difficulties in collecting experience based data rather than dealing with the perception of 
corruption, which allows for less ownership of individuals in research and therefore potentially 
more freely shared information. However, the real question of the usefulness of these finding 
could be more pertinent, since these demographics reflect individuals that are generally in 
positions of power in corrupt and non-corrupt organizations as well as positions of public 
service.  
 
The Social Cognitive theory 
 
Knowing the demographics of individuals likely to be targets of corruption allows for a 
degree of focus while we address the more central issues of the predispositions of these 
individuals such as individual integrity and levels of moral development and moral identity, 
along with the environmental elements that encourage the factors that are so central to our micro 
analysis. The idea that corruption is attributed to individual predispositions such as moral 
identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002) or low levels of cognitive moral development (Kohlberg, 1975; 
Trevino, 1986) has strong theoretical support.  The social cognitive theory of learning (Bandura, 
1991) deals specifically with the latter. It states that individuals learn from direct experience, 
human dialogue and interaction and observation. Built from the social learning theory, the social 
cognitive theory describes learning in terms of the interrelationship between behavior, 
environmental factors, and personal experience. (Kritsonis, 2005 and Robbins, 2003) For 
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example, how people interpret the outcomes of their own behavior informs and alters their 
environment and the personal factors they possess which then informs and alters subsequent 
behavior. The foundation of the theory is of reciprocal determinism, the view that (a) personal 
factors - in the form of cognition, affect, and biological events, (b) behavior, and (c) 




Adapted from; Social Foundations of thought and Action: A social Cognitive Theory, Bandura (1986) 
  
 
 In 1991 Bandura went on to make the connection of his theory to moral thought 
development. Here he echoes the importance of a point of view that, despite its focus on 
individual behavior, intertwines with society in the form of consensual moral codes (Bandura, 
1991). He states, “Societal codes and sanctions articulate collective moral imperatives as well as 
influence social conduct” adding, “however, external sanctions are relatively weak deterrents 
because most transgressive acts can go undetected” (p.02). His research goes on to show that 
self-sanction plays a crucial role in regulating moral conduct; an area that he points out is 
distinctly different from the majority of research that focuses on moral thought. In essence 
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Bandura makes the distinction between what we know to be ‘right’ and our actual moral conduct. 
He also states; 
 
Conduct is most congruent with moral standards when transgressive behavior is 
not easily self-excusable and the evaluative reactions of significant others are 
compatible with personal standards. Under conditions of shared moral standards, 
socially approvable acts are a source of self-pride and socially punishable ones are 
self-censured. (Bandura, 1991, p. 21) 
 
Further underscoring the notion that an organization or society entrenched in corruption 
is something not easily overcome. Still he goes on to explain that individuals generally select 
associates who share similar standards of conduct which supports their own system of self-
evaluation, an idea that can enhance social influences or buffer individuals from them, meaning a 
diversity of social standards, through selective association, can actually “forge consistency out of 
diversity” (p.21). 
Much like the interaction of the three influences found in the social cognitive theory of 
learning, moral conduct is a reciprocity of influence between (a) thought and self-sanction, (b) 
conduct, (c) a network of social influences. 
Corruption and Education:  An Interdisciplinary Approach   38 
 
Adapted from; Social Foundations of thought and Action: A social Cognitive Theory, Bandura (1986) 
 
 
The social cognitive theory explains how people acquire and maintain certain behavioral 
patterns, while also providing the basis for intervention strategies (Bandura, 1997). Evaluating 
behavioral change depends on the factors environment, people and behavior, as would any anti-
corruption scheme that hoped to affect the moral conduct of individuals in a society. In relation 
to the use of education as a tool to battle corruption Bandura’s theory would suggest that a 
successful strategy to change the moral conduct, in our case to change corrupt behavior, requires 
a change in the networks of social influence which, in the case of endemic corruption, clearly 
requires a catalyst with-in that society to bring about change, as is show-cased in the long 
analysis later on. This aligns with the commonly held belief that for legislative and institutional 
changes to be effective in an anti-corruption strategy there must also be genuine desire of 
“ownership” with-in that individuals, organizations or groups involved, it also supports a 
“control” anti-corruption strategy as defined by Everett, Neu, and Rahaman (2006), which will 
be explained more in the macro analysis. A lack of the element of individual ownership can be 
attributed to a large share of the failure of anti-corruption around the world since, at high ranking 
political levels individuals can appear to promote anti-corruption strategies yet act in their own 
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best interest rather than that of the larger population they serve, exemplifying the principle agent 
paradigm. In using the social cognitive theory as a tool of micro analysis we gain a compelling 
case for altering moral conduct on a micro level from an often under utilized psychological point 
of view of the subject.  The social cognitive theory provides a framework for designing, 
implementing and evaluating programs to address not only changing moral conduct but also 
instilling the self sanction element into individuals that can create a network of social influence 
in the long term, keeping in mind that the individual “ownership” of change is needed for the 
triad to be complete and create a situation ripe for the change of individual’s cognition, self 
sanction and eventually, moral conduct.  
 
Transparency International’s (TI) Global Corruption Barometer (2005) gives a clear 
picture of the wide-ranging influence of corruption within a number of sectors and institutions. 
Based on the perception of 55,000 people in 69 low, middle and high income countries on a 
range of issues relating to existence and impact of corruption within a number of sectors and 
institutions (see Appendix 1). Political parties were perceived as the most corrupt, while 
parliament/legislature, police and legal system/judiciary all followed in descending order. This 





Why have we been ineffective thus far?  
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Through the use of Klitgaard’s widely know C = M + D - A model of anti-corruption 
where corruption (C) is measured as a sum of Monopoly power (M) and discretion (D) minus 
accountability (A) we get a clearer picture of the composition of institutional corruption on a 
micro level. Klitgaard’s model suggests clear theoretical premises to be used in the creation or 
restructuring of political institutions. The need to reduce monopolistic control and narrow the 
discretionary power of institutions while increasing their accountability to the public they are 
created serve is crucial to corruption reduction in political sectors.  
 
These premises have been used since 1988 when Klitgaard created this model citing a 
few examples of success. Andvig and Fjeldstad stated, “Klitgaard (1988) provides some 
interesting cases of successful anti-corruption reforms, including the reform of the tax 
administration in the Philippines under the late President Marcos. However, without exception 
the “successful” cases presented by Klitgaard have proved to be unsustainable.” (2001) The 
reason could be lack of a strong civil society including an educated population to hold politicians 
accountable, since its the society sets the standard of acceptable practice for the long term, 
keeping in mind that internal will for change is needed as well. Yet a heavy focus has been 
placed on Klitgaard’s corruption calculus, speculatively to the benefit of the large global actors 
who support the theory (Perkins, 2004). Andvig and Fjeldstad point out that,  
 
Until recently the World Bank was criticized of playing down more indirect 
means of reducing corruption such as the strengthening of public institutions and 
increasing public education and awareness (Riley, 1998, p.138). This critique has 
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been advocated by, for instance, Transparency International that emphasizes the 
importance of civil society and public awareness in fighting corruption (2001, p. 
105). 
 
Micro Analysis Summary 
 
Using CORij f(Xij;Cj;Hj;Kj)  (Macon, 2006) to show the demographics of where and to 
whom in society corruption is likely to appear we can begin to make decisions in anti-corruption 
strategy such as where to aim our attempts at transparency and accountability to achieve the best 
results and how to create more accurate measurements of actual corruption as we battle it in 
societies. Bandura’s social cognitive theory of learning, and it’s adaptation toward moral 
conduct, describe the interplay between (1) Personal factors, (2) environmental factors and (3) 
actual behavior, or as adapted to moral conduct (1) network of social influences,  (2) thought and 
self sanction, and (3) moral conduct and give us valuable knowledge about individual behavior 
change. The social cognitive theory provides a framework for designing, implementing and 
evaluating programs to address not only changing moral conduct but also instilling the self 
sanction into individuals that creates a network of social influence in the long term, keeping in 
mind that the societal “ownership” of change is needed for the triad to be complete with the 
hopeful result of long term change of moral conduct and eventual change in shared values. We 
also found that the corruption calculus, C = M + D - A  ( Klitgaard, 1988) while valuable for 
insight into micro analysis, has been over used and that even found to cause corruption (Andvig 
and Fjeldstad, 2001) where decentralization of political systems in developing countries actually 
further corrupts.  
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Macro Analysis  
 
 
Earlier in the micro analysis section we discussed the social cognitive theory of moral 
development (Bandura, 1991), which took into account Kohlberg’s stages of moral development 
theory. Though Bandura chose not to incorporate stages but rather to use an interplay of 
reciprocal determinism, a stage theory, as we’ll see here, works well in examining organizations, 
rather than individuals, on national and international levels as a moral entity, which will allow us 
to shed light on education and moral development on a macro level. Here we will take a different 
sort of look into corruption than most have thus far, we’ll call into question not only the supply 
and demand side of corruption but also the interventionist relationship played by aid and 
development organizations using Kohlberg’s stage of moral development theory. 
 
Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development 
 
On a basic level Kohlberg’s theory allows for three levels of moral development, stage 
one - pre-conventional, deals in the realm of the individual where a “sticks and carrots” or 
reward and punishment mentality override moral decisions. In the pre-conventional stage 
individuals, or organizations as we’ll adapt the theory to, acts with their own interests in mind 
first and use sanction or punishment to limit the bounds of their actions. In stage two – 
conventional, individuals consider law and order and the group or communal importance of 
moral decisions. The conventional stage is typical for adolescents and adults and morality is 
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characterized by an acceptance of society's conventions concerning right and wrong, here an 
individual obeys rules and follows society's norms. Stage three – post-conventional, individuals 
use the principle of morality they live by their own principles about right and wrong that may or 
may not parallel those of the society around them, but principles that typically include such basic 
human rights as life, liberty, and justice. 
 
 
Source: information taken from: Kohlberg, L. (1975). The cognitive-developmental approach to 




On nearly all levels of operation the ethics of an organization effect society, and thus 
firms (notably from the western world where capitalistic/free market economic models abound) 
face a considerable amount of peer pressure to operate within certain moral principles. Corporate 
social responsibility regards the moral obligations the firms (organizations) have to the societies 
they operate in, which are, at times, administered through self-regulation. Given that capitalism 
is driven by the profit motive, there is an obvious call for moral principles in firms’ operations, 
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especially on an international level where accountability is at its lowest, and cultural and 
economical divergences can be made excuses for actions that most would deem “immoral”. 
Within countries, institutions form the guidelines of behavior that organizations must follow. 
Falkenberg stated, “Institutions include the legal and regulatory framework in a jurisdiction as 
well as the norms, values, customs and patterns of behavior present in a particular place at a 
given time” (2004, p.4). He raises the notion of a need for shared yardstick with which to 
measure the behavior of organizations across cultures and time by use of a neutral panel under a 
veil of ignorance. He calls for the establishment of a universal “GOOD” and says the use of 
“accumulated time honored wisdom of multiple cultures can help us form a universal notion of 
ethics” (Falkenberg, 1996, p.12) Further in his work he uses Lawrence Kohlberg’s stages of 
moral development framework to assess the ethical maturity of corporate moral reasoning. He 
points out that in microeconomics and finance we have seen an emergence of transaction cost 
economics and the principal agent theory, both of which include the assumption that man is 
opportunistic, selfish and not necessarily honest. (2004, p.18) Much to the same effect Everett, 
Neu and Rahaman bring the idea of ethical decision making into the macro arena by calling into 
question the moral dispositions of international governing bodies that are integral actors in the 
field today. It is these organizations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Transparency International, USAID, 
the United Nations, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Organization of American 
States, and the Council of Europe, that produce the majority of literature on corruption and, 
arguably, it is because of these organizations and their own political or economic agendas that 
the majority of anti-corruption schemes are founded on institutional framing and economic 
principles, or “control” and “exit” approaches rather than the involvement of civil societies or 
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“voice” centered approaches, though several if not all of these organizations do incorporate civil 
society to a much lesser degree into their scheme in some form. (Everett, Neu, Rahaman, 2006) 
  Since John Dewey brought about the cognitive-development approach (Kohlberg, 1975) 
Kohlberg and Piaget began to redefine and validate Dewey’s work into the stages of the moral 
development theory today. This theory is not only taught in classrooms today but is also used in 
heavily in the research arena to describe various phenomena, as in the analysis of this article. 
 In this macro analysis of the global infrastructure in relation to corruption it seems 
befitting to take a look at those organizations that operate in all or many of the socio-economic 
arenas involved. In this case we’ll assess the United State Agency for international Development 
(USAID), and use Kohlberg’s stages of moral development to do so.  As a government run, 
taxpayer funded organization; USAID understandably requires a high level of justification for 
the programs it undertakes and the use of its funds. Today USAID spearheads the development 
operations of the American people though; in the past this task was split between several federal 
agencies some of which still operate on certain levels today in collaboration with USAID under 
what is deemed a whole of government approach.  As realizations about development and 
corruption have become mainstream around the world USAID has slowly, as is normal for 
governmental versus non governmental organizations, begun to implement anti-corruption 
elements into nearly all of it’s operations from food and health aid to the support of democracy 
and governance and even in conflict mitigation. But the truth about state run development 
organizations, especially USAID while the USA stands alone atop the world stage as it does 
today, is that all facets of the federal government represent the entire state and all it’s varied 
interests.  In 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz said, “our foreign assistance programs are 
vital to the achievement of our foreign policy goals” (1986). Still, this shouldn’t surprise us; 
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every country’s foreign aid is a tool of foreign policy. Whether that aid benefits the citizens of 
the developing country is determined by the motives and goals of that policy and is outlined by 
how a government defines national interest. (Sullivan-Catlin, Lappé, Collins, 2000) In the case 
of USAID all funding is passed through, and approved or disapproved by the Department of 
State the federal Executive Department responsible for international relations.  USAID has 
actually gone through historical phases of full control by the Department of State, even today 
talk of the same scenario lingers while, in some cases, program and policy formation is still 
heavily influenced by State Department. In fact huge amounts of time and energy are being spent 
internally on the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) which is an internal 
review the State department and USAID have undertaken to analyze this long term relationship 
of the two with the goal of integrating diplomacy and development missions under one planning 
process.  What this means in a pragmatic sense is that not only do the funds for development get 
approved in accordance with the varied needs of the US Government as it relates abroad as a 
whole, but that programs and their implementation are actually developed and weighed against 
the needs of US security and Military initiatives for example, or even domestic economic 
situations under the US Department of State, the governing body that controls operations such as 
home land security, the department of defense and even the department of commerce which is 
responsible for, among other things, promoting American job creation. It is clear that the motives 
of such an organization cannot be purely altruistic. Perhaps private organizations are more suited 
for development work, or perhaps there is a need to focus or even solely operate in form of 
facilitating local institutions taking away the opportunity to for dual-hatted reform initiatives. 
Given the lack of success globally at combating corruption it is only reasonable to assume that 
successfully combating such a complex problem requires sincere motives and undivided 
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attention. Yet, the majority of the most influential actors, are those who are also involved in 
global governance, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, Transparency International, USAID, the United 
Nations, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Organization of American States, and the 
Council of Europe. All of these organizations are involved in the arena of global governance, an 
arena which contains divergent interests and diverse geopolitical realities (Everett, Neu, 
Rahaman, 2006) These men find that the definition of corruption given by a the largest global 
actors in anti-corruption gives quick insight into their “solution”. They go into more detail 
pointing out that the actors who agree upon the definition of corruption as ‘‘the misuse of public 
office for private gain,’’ such as the World Bank and the Intentional Monetary Fund follow that 
idea by making scapegoats of members of public office and they are intentionally pushing for a 
free market, an “exit” strategy that benefits their needs regardless of the results (often harmful) in 
the host country. Their comprehensive research into the field of anti-corruption and ethics 
framing ends by saying, “It is worth reiterating that the fight against corruption is a function of 
specific acts and specific actors, making it a field where both ethical rules – hypernorms – and 
ethical actors are together needed.” (2006, p.9) Keeping in mind the that the pre-conventional 
stage of Kohlberg’s moral development includes actors who use rewards and punishment as the 
bounds for their moral reasoning it is all to easy, and disheartening, to find that we must place 
some of the largest actors in fight against corruption into this stage. 
 
Macro Analysis Summary 
Our macro analysis has revealed that the most influential actors in the global anti-
corruption arena, are those who are also involved in global governance, the World Bank, the 
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International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Transparency International, USAID, the United Nations, the International Chamber of 
Commerce, the Organization of American States, and the Council of Europe, and often have 
allegiances and obligations to their own regions or nations first. In the end, whether their aid, or 
anti-corruption schemes benefit the citizens of the developing country is determined by the 
motives and goals of their policies, and is outlined by how a government defines their own 
national interest. What is worse is that in the past the presence and authority that these agencies 
hold has allowed them to have the leverage to act on their own national interests rather than on 
the behalf of the host countries their programs are intended to aid, as in the case of the World 
Bank and IMF (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001 Perkins, 2004 et al.) in light of this behavior these 
actors would have to be placed in the pre-conventional stage (stage one) of Kohlberg’s moral 
stages of development along with the kleptocrats that commit some of the most unscrupulous 
acts of corruption themselves. 
 
Wide Analysis  
 
In our wide analysis of education and it’s interplay with corruption we will take a system-
wide perspective that includes the supply and demand sides of corruption, that includes the entire 
infrastructure of the global economy as well as national diplomacy, non-governmental and even 
religious organizations and the interaction between them in societies as they interact with each 
other on a system wide level. (Ashford, Gioia, Robinson & Trevin, 2008) This wide global 
infrastructure certainly includes education and takes into consideration the supply and demand 
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side of corruption much like our micro analysis did where demographics pointed out individuals 
who were likely to be asked for a bribe. 
 
Empirics and Widespread Corruption 
 
No organized system can function efficiently as long as corruption is endemic, 
governments, businesses, non-profit organizations; Wall Street and event global capitol markets 
rely on the faith of stakeholders to function. Even globally the world has trended toward a 
capitalistic model (Ashford, Gioia, Robinson & Trevin, 2008), that are founded on business 
functioning properly, a notion that makes corruption the primary enemy of efficiency. 
Additionally, if the trust that stake holders place in any organization or regulatory mechanism 
falters, regardless of the initial source, the effects are often system wide. And yet, academics, 
global and local media and even individual citizens all acknowledge that the presence of 
corruption and scandal are widespread, pointing to the scale and scope of the problem. 
Transparency International’s global corruption barometer points out what elements of society are 
perceived to be the most corrupt on a global scale, and leaves little doubt of the wide range of 
corruption globally. This particular research sought the opinion of 55,000 people in 69 low, 
middle and high-income countries on a number of corruption based issues. The graph below 
indicates the results of this research in regards to which sectors and institutions are perceived to 
be the most corrupt. 
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Reviewing this data points to the sweeping presence of corruption in societies around the 
world, placing political parties, parliaments, police and legal systems at the top of the list for the 
most corrupt, and putting non governmental organizations and religious bodies at the bottom of 
the list.  Zuckerman’s (2006) review of the prevalence of cheating in the United States in 
everything from, business and taxes to sports and cable television, fuels the fire that is echoed in 
argument of David Kuzilva, a citizen of Tanzania, who pointed out the presence of pride in many 
developing countries that accompanies their rejection of the wealthier west’s solutions to local 
problems of corruption, often times despite their subsequent acceptance of aid, which is a great 
segue into our next point, who accepts that aid? 
We just reviewed the figures from Transparency International’s Global Corruption 
Barometer that pointed to political parties and parliaments as the most corrupt sectors or 
institutions. It is in these very sectors where the leaders of society are found. In developing 
countries, we’ll look at the African continent, these leaders either have access to arenas that 
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allow them to acquire more education or they are selected because they are more educated. In 
any case, if we look at the make up of top political leaders on the African continent and compare 
that to literacy rates in them we see that African political leaders are considerably more educated 
than the poorer populations they serve (see Appendix 2 & 3). 
If we consider the principle agent paradigm we would say that these political leaders are 
the agents and it would appear that the problems of moral hazard and conflict of interest where 
the agent pursues their own interests rather than the principal's interests is all to often played out. 
This scenario is more conspicuous when we look closer at the table of education among African 
leaders and see that these men and woman are often educated not only outside their home 
countries but quit often in developed western countries with predominantly capitalist, free 
market economies. The prevalence of corruption on the African continent (see Appendix 5) 
could be attributed to these men and woman being educated in systems that instill capitalistic, 
free market concepts of organizational operation that function well in developed countries where 
developed institutions, governance mechanisms, and transparency have strong roots, but merely 
give an understanding of business models that are used for private gain upon returning to their 
home.  Ashford, Gioia, Robinson and Trevino (2008) recall an Aspen Institute study that showed 
that MBA graduates favored shareholder interests (or primarily placing emphasis on shareholder 
interest) much more strongly at the end of their MBA studies in America, and called into the 
question the sort of ethical leadership they were releasing into a society where corruption is so 
widespread. A simple perusal of recent world news shows that multi national corporations show 
little reluctance to push the boundaries of moral action in the international arena where the 
governing laws of their home countries don’t apply. Their are countless examples of corporations 
headquartered in developed free market economies lead by those educated in western countries 
Corruption and Education:  An Interdisciplinary Approach   52 
(perhaps along side their future African leader’ counterparts) who have shown disregard for 
human rights and societal well being when there is a lack of institutional regulation or 
governance. For example Foxxcon, a manufacturer of electrical components (notably electrical 
connectors for computer components) provides components to such upstanding western 
companies as Apple, has factories that have been described even by Chinese media as labor 
camps, detailing widespread worker abuse and illegal overtime not to mention numerous worker 
suicides that have even recently made news (Dean, 2010; et al.). 
Studies of the direct relationship of education on corruption are few but recent work has 
shed light on the relationship. Cheung and Chan (2008) use Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions 
as the exogenous independent variables to predict corruption through several endogenous 
independent variables (namely, educational, political and economical factors) to examine 
corruption perceptions in 56 countries and find that both enrollment in tertiary education (and 
gross GDP per capita) can strongly predict Corruption Perception scores. They state “As more 
people participated in tertiary education the lower its incidence of corruption across nations… 
the results of this current study indicate that the effort educators have put in teaching students to 
be morally and socially responsible persons has a noticeable effect“ (p. 235). Also, work under 
way by Christian Bjørnskov (2003) at the Department of Economics Aarhus School of Business 
find a strong causal link between higher levels of social capital (including education as an 
indicator) and less corruption. He suggests that it is possible to build social capital through 
investing in education, other forms of social capitol, some level of income redistribution and 
therefore reduce corruption; his work in European countries has produced interesting results thus 
far. 
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Wide Analysis Summary 
 
 Our wide analysis of corruption has revealed the system wide prevalence of corruption 
across the entire infrastructure of the global economy; diplomacy, non-governmental and 
governmental, western developed countries included. We have also found that leadership in 
developing countries (represented by Africa) almost invariably have considerably more 
education than the populations they serve, (see Appendix 2&3) and yet interestingly that as 
tertiary education rises corruption decreases. So, though higher education might cause corruption 
in cases, as in Africa where highly educated leaders steadily lead countries with the some of the 
highest rates of corruption globally, (see Appendix 5) it also reduces corruption as evidenced by 
the finding that tertiary education is negatively correlated with corruption perceptions. Perhaps it 
can be said that in cases where the disparity in education between the leaders of a country and 
the individuals in society is great, corruption is inclined to prosper. 
 
Long Analysis  
 
In our “long” analysis we will investigate the interplay between corruption and education 
over time. Since corruption has only been directly addressed in more recent history, starting with 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 in the United States, there is a dearth of history to 
investigate. However, if we consider corruption to be a culturally deep seeded social injustice, as 
endemic corruption is often described in under developed countries, there are other historical 
cases that can be considered and used for comparison. 
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Moral Suasion and Historical Change 
 
One of these historical cases of deep seeded injustice in society is that of slavery in the 
United States prior to 1865 when it was outlawed by the 13th amendment to the US constitution. 
Though more direct measures were eventually taken to end slavery in the USA a large part of the 
success of its abolition was the wave of public opinion that changed as a result of the use of 
moral suasion by the few individuals who stood against the societal norms they believed to be 
morally wrong. Moral suasion is the act of trying to use moral principles to influence individuals, 
groups and even nations to change their policies. The beginning of the change that took place in 
societal norms in the USA was rooted in the use of moral suasion by individuals like; Lewis 
Tappan, James G. Birney, and William Lloyd Garrison. These individuals, through no small 
amount of effort and intestinal fortitude, awoke the American people to their heresy.  
 
In what other system did exploitation of the defenseless occur more brazenly? 
Where was sexual wantonness more rampant than in the debauchery by masters of 
their female slaves? Where was impiety more deliberately fostered than in 
masters’ refusals to permit their slaves to read the Scriptures? Where was brutality 
more evident than in the master’s heavy use of whips, or his willingness to 
dismember the slaves’ ties of family? (Stewart, 2007 p. 5) 
 
 Although the eventual end of slavery required more than moral suasion alone, requiring 
civil war and large loss of life, moral suasion played a large role in bolstering support among 
citizens and awakening individuals to the disparity in their moral beliefs and the practices they 
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had allowed to become norms in society. Endemic corruption as a phenomenon can be likened to 
slavery in that; in both cases the societies and cultures’ involved (in the USA and today in all 
nations where corruption is rampant) could find a disparity in the actions that were found to be 
social norms and their individual moral values. 
 Moral suasion is a tactic that has, through no small amount of action and at times 
individual sacrifice, achieved astounding results through out history. Yet, as an instrument for 
change it generally garners little attention from researchers aside from a few specific historical 
events, which is surprising considering the large role it plays in daily life, and it certainly has 
gained little to no attention in the world of anti-corruption schemas, though public and private 
pleas for change on moral basses have no doubt been used, moral suasion as a societal tool in the 
battle against corruption remains underutilized. Still, some examples exist; one of the biggest 
examples of its use is in the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), an initiative to encourage 
businesses worldwide to adopt sustainable and socially responsible policies, and to report on 
their implementation. UNGC has been highly criticized for its lack of monitoring or 
enforcement, but clearly fully employs moral suasion as it appeals to the corporate world on a 
moral level. 
Today the use of the term moral suasion has come to be largely associated with the fiscal 
policy used by the US Federal Reserve to encourage bank behavior through threats of certain 
action (also known as jawboning). But the definition of moral suasion is far boarder than that, for 
our purposes we’ll define moral suasion as the act of persuading by appealing to one's sense of 
morality. There are no shortage of examples of moral suasion in history, its successes range from 
the abolition of slavery in the US to Canadian women's suffrage and more recently it has been 
seen on multiple occasions being used by American President Barak Obama in an attempt to 
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bring change in America on a number of cases with moral suasion rather than legislation (see 
Reuters, Mar 16, 2009). Ernesto and Pedro Dal Bo put it this way. 
 
Instances of moral suasion are ubiquitous ——they take place in religious 
ceremonies (avoid sin), political arguments (this policy is right), they are part of 
educational indoctrination (it is wrong to cheat), marketing strategy (buy fair 
trade), and the workplace (be a team player). This suggests that there might be 
room for motivation through moral appeals beyond what money (or other forms 
of compensation) can buy. (Dal Bo and Dal Bo, 2009) 
 
The work of Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2009) finds that moral suasion does indeed effect 
behavior; with the caveat that its effectiveness also seems to depend on individuals expectations 
about mutual behavior among their peers. They also conclude their research by saying, 
 
However, our results also indicate that the potential for persistent positive effects 
depends on the richness of the strategic environment in which moral suasion is 
used. In our experiment, the interaction of a moral frame and the presence of 
punishments appears important to sustain cooperation when moral messages or 
punishments alone could not do so (Dal Bo and Dal Bo, 2009, p. 20) 
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 It is these final concluding remarks that point to the need for more than simple appeals to 
moral reasoning for change in moral conduct. They state that the results depend on the strategic 
environment in which they are used, which shows the need for more than simple moral appeal 
but also the proper environments, or arenas as Coleman (1971) and Falkenberg (1998) call them, 
a notion we’ll explore further late-on in our long analysis. 
 If we consider the perspective of businesses in relation to moral suasion we can begin to 
see the way it requires internal will to comply, and the power that it can have on society. 
Regarding moral suasion as an economic policy, J.T. Romans put it this way, 
 
The sphere for moral suasion, or any other economic policy, is where individual 
profit-seeking activity does not maximize the national welfare, i.e., where the 
particular and the social interests diverge. Thus, moral suasion must encourage 
private economic units to undertake actions which are unprofitable and which 
they would not undertake otherwise (1966). 
 
 As we consider this point it seems relevant to revisit Kohlberg’s stages of moral 
development and see the manner in which external pressure (through moral suasion) with only 
reason, and no power of enforcement, can be a driving force that brings about change, even 
though it may contradict the very foundations of a society, as in the case of capitalist countries. 
Could it be true that through the use of moral suasion a society can be pulled up stages in moral 
development merely by pressure from a determined contingent? 
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The Resource Arena Theory 
 
The resource arena theory was created originally by Richard Coleman in 1971 during his 
work on race relations in America. Coleman stressed that individuals achieving desirable ends 
was dependent upon their access to different arenas where the resources or capabilities they 
possessed could be used (Falkenberg, 1998). Those arenas include schools in which to use their 
personal resources (academic achievement, job skills, degree of self efficacy, et al.), which allow 
citizens to achieve certain quality of life components. The idea of access to arenas (such as an 
education system) to utilize resources (such as talents and socio-economic situations) allowing 
individuals to better their quality of life brings us back to the point at the heart of reducing 
corruption, the betterment of individuals quality of life. Conveniently it opens the door for 
development organizations, such as USAID to make a larger impact than those who are intended 
to battle corruption alone because many times these agencies already posses significant resources 
man power an potentially current programming to provide the necessary arenas that the resource 
arena theory calls for in order to raise standards of living. For our purposes that arena is schools 
systems and the goal of higher education helps solve both the development organizations aim 
and that of the individuals they are “aiding” , while also building a foundation in society to fight 
corruption. So why is education funded on a lesser level than so many other programs for these 
large actors? 
 Sirkku Hellsten and George Larbi (2006) argue that while there are cultural differences in 
ethical and social norms, corruption is more likely due to social and economic realities and the 
disconnection between societal values and the values of formal public institutions. They question 
the argument that corruption is a cultural phenomenon, an idea they say allows western countries 
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to claim a change in culture is required to eradicate corruption, and challenge the view that the 
vagueness between public and private moral requirements in a particular country is really part of 
the differences in cultural understanding and tradition itself, and finally argue that it is more 
likely due to either social and economic realities or merely the self-interest of individuals. They 
conclude with the suggestion to use civic education to spread the values of public service, and 
the rights and obligations of citizenship more widely in society. (2006) This idea that corruption 
is not a cultural phenomenon but rather a result of social and economic realities ties together 
nicely with the resource area theory (Coleman, 1971, Falkenberg, 1998) and the social cognitive 
theory of learning.  Bandura (1991) points out that internal moral self-sanction and moral 
conduct can indeed differ. He says, 
 
Most of the recent psychological interest in the domain of morality has centered 
on analyses of moral thought. … It is considerably easier to examine how people 
reason about hypothetical moral dilemmas than to study their actual moral 
conduct. The mechanisms governing the self-regulation of moral conduct involve 
much more than moral thought. (1991, p. 2) 
 
 If we consider the environment in which citizens are placed in under developed countries, 
it is not hard to understand the divergence that scholars have found between moral conduct and 
moral thought. One can know that stealing in wrong and even live by that standard on an 
individual level and act totally the opposite of that moral standard in the public realm (Hellsten 
& Lambari, 2006). A historical look at this in the US shows the lengths to which a society or 
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nation must go to reverse this kind of deep seeded social norm, and while historical research, the 
resource arena theory, and the social cognitive learning theory shed light on how this “heresy” 
can become a social norm the more important matter of how to begin reversing it can be found, 
at least to some degree, in the use of moral suasion where the collective moral self sanction that 
presides in all cultures of “GOOD”  (see Falkenberg, 1996) is upheld over the contradictory 
societal norm of corruption that has been deeply reinforced and even rewarded over time in 
many societies. 
 
Long Analysis Summary 
 
 So, the notion that we can actually affect people actions through the use of moral suasion, 
a technique that is largely unstudied but ubiquitous in societies and found all throughout history, 
along with the resource arena theory of Coleman and Falkenberg that says that individuals will 
achieve desirable ends given access to different arenas where the resources or capabilities they 
possessed could be used, such as schools, gives hope that societal change can come about. 
Clearly, moral suasion alone will not be enough, just as it was not enough for the abolitionist 
movement in the USA, to uproot such an entrenched social norm as corruption is in many under 
developed countries. Still, as research (see Dal Bo and Dal Bo, 2009) and historical evidence 
reveals, as in the case of the abolitionist movement, moral suasion can effect moral conduct and 
perhaps just as importantly forge internal ownership toward a cause (such as fighting corruption) 
based on morals that as we have found previously in our micro analysis is needed for along term 
results in anti-corruption efforts. 
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Critical analysis  
 
The weakness of this analysis is first and foremost that with out the spanning the entire 
gamut of fields and theories with-in each discipline in relation to corruption there can not be a 
holistic picture of the arenas that are in agreement and those which are in contrast. This sort of a 
study would take considerably more man hours and better funded research to pin point more 
concrete results for comprehensive results regarding the interplay between corruption and 
education. Additionally, due to the nature of the fields involved in educational related outcomes 
conclusive research is extremely hard, if not impossible, to come by, in fact, the study of social 
sciences and educational theory are constantly in flux and in the case of approaches to 
educational theory different approaches have been attempted and reversed in the United States as 
recently as the beginning of the Obama administration. Still, time has shown that theory 
grounded in principle can indeed shape favorable societal outcomes. This study merely lays the 
groundwork for a new approach toward assessing individual phenomena and their effects on 
corruption as seen through the lens of various disciplines and draws together a modest set of 
information to asses education and corruption, some of which have been ignored by researchers, 
to gain new perspectives on fighting corruption. In the end this analysis became an attempt to 
address the lack of cooperation between those fields involved in the hopes of shedding light on 
the causes of, and solutions to, corruption so that we might be able to battle it more effectively in 
the future.  
 
 




This research has found empirical, and theoretical evidence from an array of disciplines 
that supports narrowing the education gap between the general population and the highly 
educated leadership in developing countries will build the societal foundation that is needed for 
long-term success in anti-corruption schemes in developing countries. Furthermore the original 
hypothesis, H1 : Higher Education might lead to corruption in developing countries was 
supported, based on the excessively higher education levels of leaders on the African continent 
(see Appendix 2) where the basic population has low levels of literacy, (see Appendix 3) and 
where corruption levels are among the highest. (see Appendix 5) But to say that  H1 was 
supported only tells half the story. There is also strong support that education, specifically 
tertiary education, is negatively correlated with corruption perceptions. From these specific 
findings which include a broad understanding of the phenomenon correlated with corruption, and 
a consideration of past and present anti-corruption schemes this article concludes that the gap in 
education between the average citizen and the highest country leadership will provide a 
meaningful measure for future corruption reduction in developing countries.  
Perhaps just as crucial as the evidence for decreasing the education gap is the finding that 
an interdisciplinary collaboration on the multiple causes of, and cures for corruption is sorely 
lacking, and that in making a new model to include various disciplines from; psychology and 
criminology to economics and management studies (to name a few) in order to create a more 
cohesive, deeper understanding of the factors of an extremely complex phenomenon, we have 
made progress because, to put it plainly, our over emphasis of economic solutions has been 
unsuccessful. Moreover, this article reiterates the shared knowledge among researchers in 
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relation to corruption and change that the starting point in the battle against corruption is 
supporting the education of the people that make up societies in order to facilitate internal 
ownership of change. The very foundation of any long term change of societal norms must come 
from with-in that society, it can not be simply added on, and if a change is to take place for the 
good of a society it takes a sincere commitment to change by the high ranking officials and 
ordinary citizens. Outside influence has been ineffective in the long term, possibly because of the 
reluctance of outside actors to make long-term investments where results do not come quickly, or 
perhaps because they often have divided loyalties that thwart success. Also, an effective system 
of education is useless if the resources are not made available for those being educated to take 
advantage of its benefits, meaning governments, as well as relevant international organizations 
and NGO’s, all need to be sure that the basic needs of citizens are met to a degree that allows 
them to participate in the arena of education provided. The most basic of needs is a prerequisite 
to a commitment to individual advancements such as education. Research done by Cheung and 
Chan in 2008 reveals that both enrollment in tertiary education and gross GDP per capita can 
strongly predict corruption perception scores. Additionally, support has been found that cultural 
dimensions are related to corruption perception, lending more weight to the argument that those 
individuals who have a the deepest understanding of the culture (the citizens themselves) are best 
equipped to address the unique complexities of specific cultural relations to corruption and 
therefore can be effective at the task of reducing it in their own country or region. 
It is the findings of Cheung and Chan that highlight the great importance of education in 
the battle against corruption. They found that GDP per capita and Gross Enrolment in tertiary 
education could predict 80% of the variance in Corruption Perception in 56 countries.  These 
finding also support the resource arena theory created originally by Richard Coleman in 1971 
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during his work on race relations in America. Coleman stressed that an individual achievement 
of desirable ends was dependent upon their access to different arenas where resources can be 
used (Falkenberg, 1998). One of those areas could be an educational system, which allows 
citizens to use their individual resources to achieve certain quality of life components. The idea 
of access to arenas (such as an education system) to utilize resources (such as talents and socio-
economic situations) allowing individuals to better their quality of life is which is, after all, the 
point of reducing corruption altogether, for the betterment of individual’s quality of life. 
The hope is that in the future, researchers can use this framework to create a deeper 
understanding of the myriad of factors in connection with corruption globally and that the 
various disciplines involved with each respective corruption related phenomenon will share 
knowledge and grow toward the eventual success of anti-corruption efforts to snuff out the 
corruption that hold millions in poverty around the world. 
Curbing corruption may prove the most formidable challenge of mankind to date, since in 
essence it is a battle against his own selfish desires that requires a shift to higher moral reasoning 
to conquer. Though laudable at times, the efforts of the main actors in the battle against 
corruption have proven insufficient, and at their worst have been reduced to the most basic stage 
of moral reason, which gives strong support to the idea that a grassroots effort driven by the 
internal will of the local societies is needed to bring long term corruption reduction. The ancient 
words of Lao Tzu, "Give a man a fish; feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish; feed him for a 
lifetime" could not be more relevant, and it seems that it is in the teaching (education) where the 
power lies. 
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Future Work 
 
On the whole, this interdisciplinary analysis of education and corruption through various 
disciplines has brought up several questions. For example, what is the correct mixture of 
attention to education and regulatory and institutional reform in a successfully implemented long 
term corruption scheme, or since we have found internal will crucial, to what degree does a 
society need to feel ownership of the corruption initiative in order for social change to stick in 
the long term? In addition, future work should look into the success, or lack there of, of external 
interventionist organizations such as aid and development organizations versus putting efforts 
into halting the supply side of corruption perhaps with multilateral agreements that halt the flow 
of money into the hands of corrupt officials. These are studies that would greatly enhance our 
understanding of the effect of education on corruption, and are certainly inviting possibilities for 
future research.  
Ideally future work would identify and asses each phenomena known to affect corruption 
using the an interdisciplinary model and create a collaborative notion of how best to battle 
corruption. The idea that an interdisciplinary model could be used to asses a phenomena’s effect 
on corruption in a micro, macro, wide and long analysis could quickly point out disparities in 
currently held “truths” about corruption and more importantly foster a unified attack against 
corruption, an elusive adversary that is largely misunderstood and has existed far longer than our 
unsuccessful attempts to control it have. We must work collectively, across disciplines if we 
hope to progress in our battle against corruption in the future. 
 
 
Corruption and Education:  An Interdisciplinary Approach   66 
References 
 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation. American Economic Review, 91(5), 1369-1401. 
American Economic Association. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.244582. 
Ampratwum, E. (2008). The fight against corruption and its implications for development in 
developing and transition economies. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 11(1), 76-87. 
doi: 10.1108/13685200810844514. 
Andvig, J. C., & Fjeldstad, O. H. (2001). Corruption A Review of Contemporary Research. 
Human Rights (pp. 1-130). Bergen, Norway. doi: ISBN 82-8062-003-6. 
Ashforth, B., & Gioia, D., SL. (2008). Re-viewing organizational corruption. The Academy of, 
33(3), 670-684. Retrieved from http://aom.metapress.com/index/n14865258rw0572t.pdf. 
Aquino, K. (2002). The self-importance of moral identity. Journal of Personality and Social, 
83(6), 1423-1440. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.83.6.1423. 
Bailey, B. (2003). Synthesis of Lessons Learned of Donor Practices in Fighting Corruption. DAC 
Network on Governance. Retrieved from 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:SYNTHESIS+OF+LESS
ONS+LEARNED+OF+DONOR+PRACTICES+IN+FIGHTING+CORRUPTION#0. 
Bandura, A. (1991). Social cognitive theory of moral thought and action. Handbook of moral 
behavior and development (Vol. 1, pp. 1-46). Retrieved from 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.8.3063&amp;rep=rep1&amp;typ
e=pdf. 
Corruption and Education:  An Interdisciplinary Approach   67 
Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and development: a review of issues. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 35(3), 1320-1346. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2729979. 
Bjørnskov, C. (2003). Corruption and social capital. Aarhus School of Business Working Paper. 
Retrieved from http://www.hha.dk/nat/workshop/2003/CHBJ2001.PDF. 
Chakrabarti, R. (2001). Corruption: A General Equilibrium Approach. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.296859. 
Cheung, H., & Chan, a. (2008). Corruption across countries: Impacts from education and cultural 
dimensions. The Social Science Journal, 45(2), 223-239. doi: 10.1016/j.soscij.2008.03.002. 
Coolidge, J., & Rose-Ackerman, S. (1997). High-level rent-seeking and corruption in African 
regimes: Theory and cases. Policy Research Working Paper. Retrieved from 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/1780.html. 
Côté-Freeman, S., & Pope, J. (1999). Transparency International Annual Report 1999. Berlin: 
Transparency International. doi: ISBN 3-980 5657-6-9. 
Dal Bó, E., Dal Bó, P., & Berkeley, U. C. (2009). “Do the Right Thing:” The Effects of Moral 
Suasion on Cooperation (pp. 1-23). Berkeley. doi: C9, H41. 
Dean, J. (2010). Suicides Spark Inquiries. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704026204575267603576594936.html. 
Debere, S., & Sidwell, M. (2009). Transparency International Annual report 2009 (Vol. 5). 
Berlin. doi: ISBN: 978-3-935711-53-1. 
Debere, S., & Sidwell, M. (2009). Transparency International Annual report 2009 (Vol. 5). 
Berlin. doi: ISBN: 978-3-935711-53-1. 
Corruption and Education:  An Interdisciplinary Approach   68 
Desta, Y. (2004). Designing Anti-corruption strategies for developing countries: A Country 
Study of Eritrea. 
DOIG, A., & RILEY, S. (1998). Corruption and Anti-Corruption Strategies. Corruption and 
Anti-Corruption Strategies: Issues and Case Studies From Developing Countries, 3, 45-62. 
Dreher, A., & Kotsogiannis, C. (2004). Corruption around the world: Evidence from a structural 
model. Journal of Comparative (pp. 1-30). England. Retrieved from 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0147596707000522. 
Everett, J., Neu, D., & Rahaman, A. S. (2006). The Global Fight against Corruption: A 
Foucaultian, Virtues-Ethics Framing. Journal of Business Ethics, 65(1), 1-12. doi: 
10.1007/s10551-005-8715-8. 
Fagan, C. (2009). Transparency International: The Anti-Corruption Plain Language Guide. 
Language (pp. 1-56). Berlin. Retrieved from 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/other/plain_language_guide. 
Falkenberg, Andreas W. (1998). Quality of Life : Efficiency , Equity and Freedom in the United 
States and Scandinavia. Journal of Socio-Economics, 27(1), 1-27. 
Falkenberg, Andreas W. (2004). When in Rome … Moral Maturity and Ethics for International 
Economic Organizations. Journal of Business Ethics, 54(1), 17-32. doi: 
10.1023/B:BUSI.0000043498.33565.fa. 
Falkenberg, Andreas W. (1996). A Yardstick for Justice and Ethical Evaluation of Economic 
Organizations. Journal of Socio-Economics. Retrieved from 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053535799800754. 
Corruption and Education:  An Interdisciplinary Approach   69 
Getz, K. A. (2006). The effectiveness of global prohibition regimes : Corruption and the 
antibribery convention = Effectivité des régimes globaux d’interdiction. Business & society, 
45(3), 254-281. SAGE. Retrieved from 
http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=18071228. 
Godson, R. (2000). “Guide to developing a culture of lawfulness,.” Trends in Organized Crime, 
5(3), 91-102. Palermo. doi: 10.1007/s12117-000-1038-3. 
Hauk, Esther And Saez-Marti, M. (1999). On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption. 
Barcelona. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.189433. 
Hellsten, S., & Larbi, G. a. (2006). Public good or private good? The paradox of public and 
private ethics in the context of developing countries. Public Administration and 
Development, 26(2), 135-145. doi: 10.1002/pad.406. 
Huberts, L. W. J. C. (1998). What can be done against public corruption and fraud: expert views 
on strategies to protect public integrity. Crime, Law and Social Change, 29(2-3), 209-224. 
doi: 10.1023/A:1008348803253. 
Jeans, M. E. (2005). Annual report: September 2004 to November 2005. Nursing leadership 
(Toronto, Ont.), 18(4), 30-5. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18943830. 
Johnston, Michael. (2005). Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy 
Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy. The Journal of Politics (Vol. 
69). CUP. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00515.x. 
Johnston, Michael. (2010). First, Do No Harm-Then, Build Trust: Anti-Corruption Strategies in 
Fragile Situations. World Bank. Washington, DC. 
Corruption and Education:  An Interdisciplinary Approach   70 
Julia K. Murray. (2007). Mirror of morality: Chinese narrative illustration and Confucian 
ideology (pp. 1-194). University of Hawaii Press. 
Kangle, R. P. (1972). The Kautiliya Arthasastra, Part II. Bombay: U. of Bombay. 
Klemenčič, G., & Stusek, J. (2008). Specialised anti-corruption institutions: review of models. 





Klitgaard, R. E. (1988). Controlling Corruption. American Political Science Review (Vol. 83, p. 
1423). University of California Press. doi: 10.2307/1961721. 
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). DOES SOCIAL CAPITAL HAVE AN ECONOMIC PAYOFF? 
A CROSS-COUNTRY INVESTIGATION. Quarterly journal of economics, 112(4), 1251-
1288. Retrieved from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/003355300555475. 
Kohlberg, L. (1975). The cognitive-developmental approach to moral education. Phi Delta 
Kappan, 56(10), 600-677. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20298084. 
Kritsonis, A. (2005). Comparison of change theories. journal of scholarly academic intellectual 
diversity, 8(1), 1-7. Retrieved from http://nationalforum.com/Electronic Journal 
Volumes%5CKritsonis, Alicia Comparison of Change Theories.pdf. 
McCusker, R. (2006). Review of anti-corruption strategies. Technical and Background Paper, 
(23). Retrieved from 
Corruption and Education:  An Interdisciplinary Approach   71 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.137.8695&amp;rep=rep1&amp;t
ype=pdf. 
Mocan, N. (2008). What Determines Corruption? International Evidence From Microdata. 
Economic Inquiry, 46(4), 493-510. doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00107.x. 
Nelson, T. (2002). Holy Bible, KJV (p. 1056). Thomas Nelson Inc. 
Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social 
judgment (p. 334). Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 
Okonjo-iweala, N. (2007). Corruption : Myths and Realities in a Developing Country Context 
Second Richard Sabot Memorial Lecture. Policy, 1-19. 
Perkins, J. (2004). Confessions of an economic hit man. Currents (1st ed.). San Franisco: Berret - 




Pope, J. (2000). The TI Source Book 2000. 
Quah, J. S. T. (2006). Curbing Corruption: The Elusive Search for a Cure. Public Administration 
Review, 66(6), 939-943. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00709.x. 
Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice. California Law Review, 61(6), 1463. Belknap Press. doi: 
10.2307/3479817. 
Rawls, J. (1993). The Law of Peoples. Critical Inquiry, 20(1), 36-68. The University of Chicago 
Press. Retrieved from 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:The+Law+of+Peoples#0. 
Corruption and Education:  An Interdisciplinary Approach   72 
Robbins, S. (2003). Organizational Behavior (10th ed., pp. 1-704). Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall. 
Romans, J. T. (1966). Moral Suasion as an Instrunmentof Economic Policy. The American 
Economic Review, 56(5), 1220-1226. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1815305. 
Scholtens, B., & Dam, L. (2007). Cultural Values and International Differences in Business 
Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 75(3), 273-284. doi: 10.1007/s10551-006-9252-9. 
Shah, A., & Huther, J. (2000). Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs: A Framework for 
Evaluation. World. Washington, DC. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=632571. 
Spector, B. I., Johnston, Michael, & Winbourne, S. (2009). ANTICORRUPTION ASSESSMENT 
HANDBOOK. Development (pp. 1-34). Washington, DC. 
Stewart, J. (2007). From Moral Suasion to Political Confrontation : American Abolitionists and 
the Problem of Resistance , 1831-1861. Lloydia (Cincinnati) (pp. 1-35). New Haven, 
Connecticut. Retrieved from http://www.yale.edu/glc/aces/stewart/index.htm. 
Sullivan-Catlin, H., Lappé, F. M., Collins, J., Rosset, P., Esparza, L., & Lappe, F. M. (2000). 
World Hunger: Twelve Myths. Teaching Sociology. doi: 10.2307/1319272. 
Treisman, D. (2007). What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of 
cross-national empirical research?. Political Science, 10(1), 211-244. doi: 
10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.081205.095418. 
Corruption and Education:  An Interdisciplinary Approach   73 
Trevino, L. K. (1986). Ethical Decision Making in Organizations: A Person-Situation 
Interactionist Model. The Academy of Management Review, 11(3), 601-617. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/258313. 
Walker, D. (2009). Citizen-driven reform of local-level basic services: Community-Based 
Performance Monitoring. Development in Practice, 19(8), 1035-1051. doi: 
10.1080/09614520903220792. 
Warren, M. E. (2001). Social Capital and Corruption. Annual Review of Sociology, 24(1998), 15-
20. Retrieved from 
http://scholar.google.pl/scholar?q=social+capital.pdf&hl=pl&btnG=Szukaj#4. 
Xin, X., & Rudel, T. K. (2004). The Context for Political Corruption: A Cross-National 
Analysis*. Social Science Quarterly, 85(2), 294-309. doi: 10.1111/j.0038-
4941.2004.08502005.x. 
Xoohwlq, R. D. Z. (2008). Strategies to Combat Corruption. Commonwealth Law Bulletin, 34(2), 
335-345. doi: 10.1080/03050710802038437. 
Zhang, Y., Cao, L., & Vaughn, M. S. (2009). Social Support and Corruption: Structural 
Determinants of Corruption in the World. Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology, 42(2), 204-217. doi: 10.1375/acri.42.2.204. 
Zimbardo, P. G. (2004). A situationist perspective on the psychology of evil: Understanding how 
good people are transformed into perpetrators. (pp. 21-50). New York: Guilford Press. 
Zuckerman, M. B. (2006). Our Cheating hearts. U.S. News & World Report, 88. Retrieved from 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/opinion/articles/061029/6edit.htm. 





















Corruption and Education:  An Interdisciplinary Approach   75 
Appendix 2. African country leaders’ educational details for the year 2008 
 
*  Where there was no known source to obtain the information the data was left blank 
1. President Pierre Nkurunziza - Burundi Attended primary school in Ngozi province and secondary school in 
Kitega University of Burundi -he majored in education and sports. 
2. President Sir Anerood Jugnauth, KCMG, QC - Mauritius Trained and worked in law and took an active role 
in the 1960s negotiations for independence. Called to the Bar in London in 1954 
3. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf – Liberia College of West Africa, in Monrovia, BA in Accounting at 
Madison Business College in Madison, Wisconsin Diploma at the Economics Institute at the University of 
Colorado Master’s Degree in Public Administration, Harvard University 
4. President Colonel (ret.) James Alix Michel - Seychelles Trained as teacher later got involved in the booming 
tourism industry 
5. President Pedro Pires - Cape Verde Elementary and secondary education at S. Filipe, Praia and S.Vicente. In 
1956 he left to Portugal to attend Lisbon University of Sciences. However, before concluding his degree, he 
was called to serve in the Portuguese Air Force as an officer 
6. King Mswati III a.k.a. Makhosetive - Kingdom of Swaziland Masundwini Primary School and Lozitha 
Palace School. He sat for the Swaziland Primary Certificate examination in December 1982 at Phondo Royal 
Residence, First Class with merit in Mathematics and English. Mswati is the first young cadet to join the 
Umbutfo Swaziland Defence Force (USDF).Sherborne School, England  
7. President Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi - Libya Gadafi received Traditional religious primary education 
and attended the Sebha preparatory school in Fezzan and was later expelled for his political activism. Law at 
the University of Libya, where he graduated with high grades. Military Academy in Benghazi in 
1963 British Army Staff College, now the Joint Services Command and Staff College 
8. President José Eduardo dos Santos – Angola, Awarded a scholarship in 1963 to study in the Soviet Union 
where he received a degree in petroleum engineering. Upon graduation in 1969, he stayed in the Soviet 
Union to continue his studies in Communications. 
9. President Isaias Afewerki – Eritrea 
10. President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo - Equatorial Guinea Attended the Military Academy in 
Zaragoza, Spain.  
11. President João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira - Guinea Bissau Trained as an Electrician  
12. President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed – Somalia 
13. President Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé – Togo, Secondary education in Lomé Degree in financial business 
management Sorbonne, Paris Master of Business Administration degree The George Washington University 
United States. 
14. President Dr. Thomas Yayi Boni – Benin, Educated in Parakou, and later studied economics at the National 
University of Benin. He studied banking at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, Senegal, and later 
economics and politics at the University of Orléans in France and at Paris University, where he completed a 
doctorate in economics in 1976.  
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15. Educated in Parakou, and later studied economics at the National University of Benin. He studied banking at 
Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, Senegal, and later economics and politics at the University of 
Orléans in France and at Paris University, where he completed a doctorate in economics in 1976.  
16. President General (ret.) Amadou Toumani Touré - Mali Primary school in Mopti, Badalabougou Standard 
Secondary School in Bamako in order to become a teacher Joined the army and attended the Kita Inter-
Military College. 
17. President Colonel (ret.) Tandja Mamadou – Niger 
18. President Paul Kagame - Rwanda Attended Ntare Secondary School in Uganda 
19. President Blaise Compaoré - Burkina Faso Ecole primaire à Guiloungou (Ziniaré) Bachelier de 
l'enseignement secondaire, série D  
20. Presdient Ismaïl Omar Guelleh - Djbouti Highest level of formal education attained -secondary school 
21. President Girma Wolde-Giorgis – Ethiopia, Attended an Ethiopian Orthodox Church school 
22. Primary school in the village of Hoshe Bannaga, Sudan, primary & secondary education Khartoum, Joined 
the Sudanese Army and studied at the Egyptian Military Academy in Cairo  
23. President Yahya Abdul-Aziz Jemus Junkung Jammeh - The Gambia    
24. President Lansana Conté - République de Guinée, Educated at a local Koranic school and attended Dubréka 
primary school. He then went on to study at military preparatory schools in Bingerville, Côte d'Ivoire and 
Saint Louis, Senegal  
25. President Ernest Bai Koroma - Sierra Leone. Attended the Sierra Leone Church Primary School in 
Makeni, The Government Secondary School for Boys in Magburaka, Tonkolili District Fourah Bay College 
in Freetown, graduated in 1976  
26. President Laurent Koudou Gbagbo - Côte d'Ivoire 
27. President Hifikepunye Lucas Pohamba - Namibia Attended an Anglican mission school I presume for both 
primary and secondary education  
28. President Denis Sassou Nguesso - Republic of the Congo  
29. President Abdoulaye Wade - Senegal Studied and taught law at the lycée Condorcet in France. He holds two 
doctorates in law and economics. 
30. King Letsie III (original name David Mohato Bereng Seeiso) - Lesotho National University of Lesotho 
Bachelor of Arts Degree in law. Diploma in English Legal Studies at the University of Bristol in 
Britain. University of Cambridge where he studied Development Studies Wye College of the University of 
London where he studied Agricultural Economics. 
31. President Armando Emílio Guebuza - Mozambique 
32. President François Bozizé Yangouvonda - Central African Republic, Attended a military officers' training 
college in the Central African province of Bouar. 
33. President Marc Ravalomanana - Madagascar 
Corruption and Education:  An Interdisciplinary Approach   77 
34. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali – Tunisia 
35. Muhammad Hosni Mubarak – Egypt Bachelor's Degree in Military Sciences, Egyptian Military Academy 
36. Abdelaziz Bouteflika – Algeria 
37. President Paul Biya- Cameroon Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po), Paris diploma in 
International Relations 
38. President Robert Gabriel Mugabe – Zimbabwe Qualified as a teacher Bachelor of Arts degree from the 
University of Fort Hare He then studied at the University of Oxford in 1952, Salisbury (1953), Gwelo 
(1954), and Tanzania (1955–1957). Mugabe subsequently earned six further degrees through distance 
learning including a Bachelor of Administration and Bachelor of Education from the University of South 
Africa and a Bachelor of Science, Bachelor of Laws, Master of Science, and Master of Laws, all from the 
University of London External Programme. The two Law degrees were taken whilst he was in prison, whilst 
the Master of Science degree was taken during his premiership of Zimbabwe 
39. President Lieutenant General Seretse Khama Ian Khama - Botswana Sandhurst Military Academy 
40. President El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba – Gabon Secondary school 
41. President Lieutenant General Idriss Déby Itno – Chad 
42. President Bingu wa Mutharika – Malawi University of Delhi, India, master's degree in economics. PhD in 
development economics from unaccredited Pacific Western University, in Los Angeles, California. 
43. President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua – Nigeria Government College, Keffi, received a Higher School Certificate 
from Barewa College Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria BSc in Education and Chemistry and M.Sc Degree 
in Analytical Chemistry 
44. President John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor - Ghana Prempeh College (1954-58) LL.B Bachelors of Law , 
Lincoln's Inn, London (1959-1961) and Exeter College, University of Oxford (1961-1964) BA Economics , 
Philosophy and Politics. 
45. President Joseph Kabila Kabange - Democratic Republic of Congo Secondary School in Mbeya Tanzania  
46. Western Sahara 
47. President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni - Uganda Economics and Political Science University of DaresSalaam (I 
don't know if he graduated) 
48. President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete - Tanzania University of DaresSalaam Bachelors Degree in Economics  
49. President Mwai Emilio Kibaki – Kenya Economics, History and Political Science at Makerere University 
College, Kampala, Uganda Bachelors of Science with Distinction in Public Finance at the London School of 
Economics   
50. General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz - Mauritania   
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51. King Mohammed VI - Morocco He attended the Qur'anic school at the Royal Palace where he learned the 
Qur'an by heart, and received a religious and traditional education. Primary and secondary studies at the 
Royal College B.A in law at the College of law of the Mohammed V University, Rabat. Certificat d'Études 
Supérieures (CES) in political sciences & Diplôme d'Études Approfondies DEA in public law. Trained in 
Brussels with Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission Doctorate in law (PhD) with 
"Very Honourable" distinction and the Congratulations of the Jury on 29 October 1993 from the French 
University of Nice Sophia Antipolis for his thesis on "EEC-Maghreb Relations."  
52. The Late President Levy Patrick Mwanawasa - Zambia Law degree University of Zambia. 
Source: various online sources including Wikipedia.org (http://www.wikipedia.org, 2010)
 79














Appendix 4. Resource Arena Model 
 
 
Source: Andrew W. Falkenberg’s Quality of life: Efficiency, Equity and Freedom in the United States and 
Scandinavia, 1998 
Appendix 5 CPI World map 
 
 







Appendix 6. Interdisciplinary Model of Analysis 
 
 
Model influenced by a special topic forum of the Academy of Management Review (2008) 
 
